遊戲規則 上街人民主導

【明報專訊】作者為中文大學學生

七一前，曾特首民望高企，經濟轉好，明光社反對同志團體行頭而杯葛上街，陳日君(相關新聞 - 網站)不鼓勵天主教徒遊行等等的因素，令大家認為此次上街人數會大幅減少。結果，七一大遊行最後只有2萬人參與，甚至低於政府的預期，少得令人大跌眼鏡。

親政府團體巡遊的人數比七一上街還要多，但正當親政府人士為巡遊人數上的勝利而沾沾自喜，他們卻沒有意識到，遊戲規則已經被上街的人民主導了。從前親政府人士不用理會市民大眾，不用理會遊行，只需在電視機面前講一兩句便可。現在，他們也要在人數和宣傳上跟民陣打拼，然後公布人數和對方比較。

昨天的遊行包含了很多其他不同的訴求，也可能有很多人並不是以爭取普選為目標的。但是，不論如何，上街已經成為了表示對政府不滿的象徵符號。每年同月同日，統計上街和巡遊雙方的人數就是執政者收成績單的時候。過去兩年的七一，直接令高官下台，政策改變，間接令董建華(相關新聞 - 網站)下台。七一上街，是一個普選的代替品，代表你投票﹔上哪邊，就等於你投哪一邊的票。民陣遊行的票愈多，愈能有機會影響政府施政。

所以，七一的價值，並不是單單從人數和媒體宣傳量去衡量。無論它的主題如何不清晰，由什麼人帶頭，引起什麼內部糾紛也好，只要它能搞得成，就已經是成功。

夾縫間的殖民機器 - 論香港的語文教育

此乃 CRS 3001 "帝國主義、殖民主義與文化", 導師為黃慧貞教授

後殖民國家在語言教育上的抗爭一直是文化研究的重點。在許多亞洲和非洲國家的例子，語言抗爭的討論多是集中於以本土語言去抵抗殖民語言，又或是如何在全球化和維繫本土文化兩者之間取捨平衡。香港作為英國的殖民地，有關語文教育政策的爭論也一直沒有停止過。爭取成立中文中學的呼聲早在二十年代初便已經喊出，隨後香港大學成立中文系、大量中文中學的興起、中文大學的成立及七十年代的中文運動，都被認為是反殖反英的勝利。九七後，香港回歸祖國，當一般人認為語文將不再成為重要的議題之際，母語教學及最近中文大學國際化的事件，都證明語文教育並不是一個單單換了國旗和國歌就能解決的問題。

語言是文化和意義的載體，也是一個族群來認知世界的工具。它從來都不是透明的中介，每一個文字符號都充滿語用者的意識形態和價值。佔有語言，就意味著得到意義的主導權和文字的闡釋權。殖民者的文化，就是透過語言，堂而皇之的進入被殖者政治、經濟、文學以至生活每個細節和層次。而要佔有語言這個表意工具，教育就是殖民者和被殖者雙方互相爭奪的堡壘。成功控制教育，就能以它作為生產和傳播殖民意識的機器。故殖民地一般以母語教學作為解殖的重要手段。然而，香港的殖民及後殖歷史，牽涉到方言與國語，國家與地方，甚至東方與西方等非常複雜的問題。我想指出，香港的語文政策，由港英到特區時代，從來都不是為解殖及建構身份為目標，而是被當作生產殖民意識的機器。本文將重新檢視香港的近代史，進一步闡述香港的教學語言政策如何在兩個宗主國之間發展。


港英時代的殖民教育

「我們要教育那些不能被他們的母語教育的人。我們一定要教他們一些外語…即使在西方的語言中，這種語言也是最優秀的…」[1]

以上是一八三五年馬可尼勳爵 (Lord Macaulay) 在一個有關英國在印度推行英語教育的演講中很著名的一句話。作為全球最大的殖民帝國，這個日不落帝國在全球擴張它的意識形態時，是有一套法則的。英式學校制度和教學材料，加強了殖民地新一代的子民對殖民政府的服從。在馬可尼的倡議下，英國在印度培養了一批印度血統但思想英化的知識份子。西方人認為，殖民地的本地人不能以自己的語言表達自己，只有西方的語言和文化，才是最優越的。

香港和印度不同。無論在歷史、地理、血源和傳統上，香港都和中國大陸有密不可分的關係，兩者難以割難。再者，英國人從來沒有打算在這片土地上殖民。史丹利勳爵便曾經說過，英國是以外交、商業和軍事的角度去處理和統治香港，而不是以殖民的角度 (a view of colonization)[2]。故此，當十九世紀英國本土已經實施強制性普及教育的時候，香港政府卻只提供精英教育予少數高等華人的子女。這些精英教育，當然是由以英語為教學語言的學校執行；相反，中文中學則被輕視。一九零二年政府教育委員會報告書，有以下一段的結語：

把教育事務集中在開導華人精英分子會比強迫一般民眾接受新思想更為有效。就目前而言，最好及唯一的辦法是讓接受了文明思想的知識領袖來潛化那些無知的大眾。因此，英文學校應比中文學校受重視。[3]

這番說話，「公開地把商業、功利及英帝國利益等理由，套上了所謂“精英” 、“無知大眾”及“西方文明思想”等西方帝國主義的優越觀念」[4]。香港政府就是以英語及英國文化作為其政策的核心價值，以教育機器宣傳這種意識形態。在此情況下，法律條文、政府文件以至教學課程都是先以英文書寫，有需要時才根據英文原本翻譯出中文版本。甚至有說當年政府的新聞發佈，都是先以英語發給南華早報，讓其他中文報紙抄譯報導。朱耀偉便曾經撰文指出香港的中文滲滿了英文文法，到處可見中文的「英文性」和「殖民性」[5]。由此語言層面開始，一個「英上中下」的社會階級關係便建立起來了。英語成為了這個社會的資本，通曉英語的人才有機會做政務官 (Administrative Officer)，有機會進入決策階層。教學語言及制度建構了一個到今時今日仍然非常穩固的「英文就是高等」的神話。


進入夾縫：殖民者與殖民者之間

隨著上述的歷史脈絡，我們不難理解為何七、八十年代前爭取提昇中文地位的各種運動都是打著反英反殖的旗號。在嬰兒潮之前，香港仍然是一個移民城市。雖說廣東話是一種主要方言，但以普通話、潮州話、福建話和客家話等為母語的新移民也是不容忽視。他們都視大陸為家、國語為自已國家的語言。北方知識份子的南下，造成北方大陸的語言及文化主導香港的文化場域。文壇上有金庸、梁羽生、劉以鬯、葉靈鳳和陶然等等；學術上有錢賓四、唐君毅、牟宗三、徐復觀等等以宏揚中國文化為已任的新儒學者。當時香港文化的代表人物，實際上是和中國大陸同一源頭，同一語言的。所以其時的中文運動，和世界上大部份殖民國的母語運動性質一樣，都是以反殖、建立身份和自我認同為目標。一九二零年，第一所漢文男子師範學校落成；一九二二年，教資會成立中文教育小組，六、七十年代中文中學更分為左右派，右派以德明、大同為首；左派則以香島和培橋為代表，互相鬥爭之餘，亦共同以反英霸權和關心祖國為宗旨。至一九七八年，中文運動的展開，成功爭取中文為合法語言，舉辦一系列的鼓吹母語的活動。故香港當時實為中國民族主義對抗殖民霸權的其中一個戰場。

在殖民地的過渡階段，一般國家都會以重建本土國族身份認同為首要任務，當中又以重新宣揚母語最為重要。它們大多會擴充教育制度，培養一批本地的解殖人才，例如公務員，外交家和教師等等，以便在後殖時期盡快擺脫前宗主國的陰影。例如尼日利亞在獨立後擴張本地教育，十六年後成功把白人中學教師的數量大幅減至百份之三十[6]。然而，香港的情況較為獨特。正因為英國從來沒有在香港進行徹底的全面殖民，除了少數精英外，大部份人根本不能以英語表達自己。一九九零年，政府的一份教育報告指出，即使是成績最優異的首百份之三十的中學畢業生，英語能力也從沒有達到老練 (sophistication) 的程度。一九九八年的一項調查更發現，普遍的大學生根本沒有足夠的英語技巧，要借助中文去完成習作。[7]

不能以英語表演自己，也沒有受過共產黨的語言訓練，香港大眾的年青一代，在缺乏「國語」的情況下，只能寄託予方言，自創港式粵語為本土意識的和文化的載體。內地在經過文革等改造運動後，無論社會集體經驗、論述方向和意識形態都與受過殖民地經驗洗禮而又自創港式粵語的香港愈走愈遠，埋下了回歸後兩地紛爭的伏線。


回歸「祖」國，「母」語教學的再殖民

「他可能會說英語或者普通話，但到底不是自小熟悉的言語，他最熟悉的粵語，卻不方便使用於書寫；他唸書時背誦古文，到社會工作卻得熟悉商業信扎的格式、廣告文字的諧謔與簡略，這種文字上的混雜不純也是文化身份的一個縮影。」[8]

也斯的說話，正好道出了以港式粵語為母語的人的心聲。在大陸和英國之間，一種「混雜不純」的交字和文化身份已經在七十年代本土意識高漲之時建立起來。這種文化不源自內地，不源自西方，也不是中英各佔一半而組成。它的混雜性、多元性、遊牧性和邊緣性，都是屬於自己，獨一無二的。

由此點出發，我們便能理解為何周蕾 (Rey Chow) 認為香港是處於殖民者與殖民者之間。「香港最獨特的，正是一種處於夾縫的特性，以及對不純粹的根源或對根源本身不純粹性質的一種自覺」，本土意識的形成及南來華人文化的退潮，使香港不再是中國民族主義對抗殖民主義的重要堡壘。她認為香港已經發展成一個處於民族主義和殖民者之間的第三空間 (third space)[9]，或者黃慧貞所講的“neither/nor space”[10]。新一代香港人以自己的城市為題材，用自己的語言書寫文學、拍攝電影，研究自己生活的這個城市。他們沒有二次大戰時的經驗，腦袋載著的，是也斯的詩、黃碧雲的小說、周星馳的電影…然而，一九八四年的《中英聯合聲明》，香港在沒有發聲權的情況下，卻被定於一九九七年回歸祖國，一個論述和香港截然不同不同的「祖」國。

回歸後首年，特區政府便已經宣佈將會推行母語教學。這項解殖工程原本在普通後殖民國是屢見不鮮，香港的母語教學實際上亦是以港式粵語作教學語言。但偏偏政府又同時訂出一百間「合資格能以英語為教學語言的學校」。那一百間學校當然是被認為最好的中學。其後，二十間中學上訴，其中十四間得值，可以繼續使用英語為教學語言。宣佈結果當日，根據《南華早報》的報導，上訴成功的家長師生，高興得跳起來互相擁抱；敗訴的那邊，則抱頭痛哭。這樣，那個在港英時代已經建立起來的「英上中下」社會關係其實在回歸後根本沒有任何改變。英語在英國人撤離後仍然處在最高的地位；港式粵語仍然是最多人用的語言；由於一國兩制的實施，普通話在香港仍舊不流行。殖民地的教育體制和語言等級在中國國旗的昇起後照樣保存。

如果這個體制繼續保持下去，那麼我不會指出香港的語文教育是身處於夾縫之間殖民機器。因為無論在結構和語文地位方面，香港的語文教育都沒有任何改變，只受到英國這一個殖民意識的衝擊。但這個情況隨著二零零三年的《提昇香港語文水平行動方案》轉變。除了繼續鼓吹母語教學外，它亦鼓勵學校以普通話教授中文科。由於現階段沒有足夠以普通話教授中文科的教師，該方案甚至建議學校從內地聘請中文教師[11]。上述一切，都證明「國語滅粵」的行動正正悄悄展開。港式粵語有別於一般中國內地的方言，因為它滲入了殖民地的語言，自創一種混雜性語言，又缺少了中國內地那些共同的國家經驗和共產主義特色的語言，它是有其獨立性的。以普通話取代港式語言教授中文，把國語、母語和一種有著獨特經驗的方言畫上等號，就正如殖民者一樣，以教育機制決定殖民地的表意符號和意義。實際上，自從回歸，一些帶中國共產黨色彩的文字已經進入了港式粵語的語言體系之中，例如「統戰」和「班子」等等。港式粵語，繼在港英時代混入了「英文性」後，在回歸後又加入了「中共性」。從以上可見，我們可以在香港的語境放入福柯 (M. Foucault) 對知識和權力的看法。教育作為一個機制，產生了知識的同時，也建構了權力。知識和權力兩者間互生互滅，哪個殖民者是權力的中心，它就可以透過教育制度產生它那一套論述的知識。

語文教育背後的迷思

以上我探討了香港在殖民地時代、過渡時期和回歸後的語文政策，指出香港教學語言的選取和語文教育制度，從來都不是以建構香港人自己的語言為宗旨。從港英時代和過渡時期的英語教學，到回歸後的母語教學以至國語滅粵，都是宗主國借教育機制消滅本土語言的策略。因此，港式粵語永遠難登大雅之堂，永遠是低等語言，以它表達自己，只會引來一班語文專家的口誅筆伐。被殖民者無法以自己的語言說話，只能借用殖民者的語言，就正如後殖民批評家斯碧娃 (Gayatri Spivak) 的名言一樣「屬僚不能說話。」 (the subaltern cannot speak)。

雖說世上並無純正的語言，語言在溝通的過程中會不停重構形態和邊界，而我們亦無法阻止殖民者語言文化上的入侵，但這不代表我們要完全放棄堅守自已的一套符號。時時刻刻察覺每一套語言和機制背後的權力關係和政治性，盡可能顛覆地接受。香港人要時常反思甚麼是母語和祖國，也要同時要避免不自覺地以自己為權力中心建立另一個大香港論述和製造一個他者。這似乎是暫時惟一可行的方法。

參考書目

中文

1. 王賡武篇:《香港史新篇》(三聯, 1997)
2. 朱耀偉:〈後殖民香港中文的迷思〉,《他性機器?後殖民香港文化論集》(青文, 1998)
3. 也斯:《都市文化與香港文學》,《當代》〔38期(1989): 16-17〕
4. 周蕾:《殖民者與殖民者之間 – 九十年代香港的後殖民自創》, 《寫在家國以外》 (牛津, 1995)
5. 語文教育及研究常務委員會: 《提昇香港語文水平行動方案: 檢討總結報告》 (2003)

英文

1. Bray. Mark: Education and Decolonization: Comparative Perspectives on Change and Continuity, International Handbook of education and development: preparing schools, students and nations for the twenty-first century, ed. William K. Cummings & Noel F. McGinn.(London, Elsevier Science 1997)
2. Chao Fen Sun: Hong Kong’s Language policy in the Postcolonial Age, Crisis & Transformation in China’s Hong Kong, ed. Ming K. Chan & Alvin Y. So (N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe 2002)
3. Macaulay, Thomas: ‘Minute on Indian Education’, The post-colonial studies reader, ed. Bill Ashcroft. Gareth Griffiths. Helen Tiffin (London: Routledge 1995)
4. Wong, Wai-Ching: Negotiating Gender Identity: Postcolonialsm & Hong Kong Christian Women, Gender and Change in Hong Kong: Globalization, Postcolonialism and Chinese Patricharchy (Vancouver, UBC Press, 2003)

[1] Thomas Macaulay: ‘Minute on Indian Education’, The post-colonial studies reader, ed. Bill Ashcroft. Gareth Griffiths. Helen Tiffin, London: Routledge 1995
[2] Chao Fen Sun: Hong Kong’s Language policy in the Postcolonial Age, Crisis & Transformation in China’s Hong Kong, ed. Ming K. Chan & Alvin Y. So, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe 2002, P. 289-290
[3] 王賡武篇:《香港史新篇》(三聯, 1997), 頁443
[4] Ibid., 頁443
[5] 可參閱朱耀偉《他性機器?後殖民香港文化論集》第六章〈後殖民香港中文的迷思〉
[6] Mark Bray, Education and Decolonization: Comparative Perspectives on Change and Continuity, International Handbook of education and development: preparing schools, students and nations for the twenty-first century, ed. William K. Cummings & Noel F. McGinn., London, Elsevier Science 1997, P.103
[7] Chao Fen Sun: Hong Kong’s Language policy in the Postcolonial Age, Crisis & Transformation in China’s Hong Kong, ed. Ming K. Chan & Alvin Y. So, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe 2002, P. 293
[8] 也斯: 《都市文化與香港文學》, 《當代》〔38期(1989): 16-17〕
[9] 可參閱周蕾《殖民者與殖民者之間 – 九十年代香港的後殖民自創》, 《寫在家國以外》
[10] 可參閱 Wong, Wai-Ching, Negotiating Gender Identity: Postcolonialsm & Hong Kong Christian Women, Gender and Change in Hong Kong: Globalization, Postcolonialism and Chinese Patricharchy (Vancouver, UBC Press)
[11]　可參考語文教育及研究常務委員會2003年的《提昇香港語文水平行動方案: 檢討總結報告》

Will Positive Liberty lead to Totalitarianism?

This is the Final paper of GPA 1095 "Issues of Political Philosophy", guided by Mr. Chow Po Chung

Liberty is a difficult and complex term to discuss in the realm of political philosophy. It is associated with many other concepts like democracy, right, and toleration…etc. One of the vital contemporary discussions of the concept of liberty is triggered by Isaiah Berlin. In his famous work ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, which is regarded as the most influential essay today, he makes a clear distinction and elaboration of positive liberty and negative liberty. And he attacks the former concept of liberty while advocating the latter one. The main reason is that positive liberty, when tracing back to our history, has been used as a tool by people to establish totalitarian rule.

The arguments in the essay have stirred up a lot of debates and discussions. For instance, G.C. MacCallum[1] and Charles Taylor[2] criticize the distinction of the concepts of liberty, and some concentrate on Berlin’s analysis of pluralism and monism. Also, some political philosophers like Adam Swift and Shi Yuankang are concerned with Berlin’s comment on positive liberty.

Different scholars have different views on the logic “positive liberty will or to large extent lead to Totalitarianism”. Some, like the Swift and Shi mentioned above, from the perspective of logic, hold the view that Berlin’s argument is weak and feeble. There is no direct and close relation between positive liberty and authoritarianism; others, like Galipeau and George Crowder[3], deal with the argument in a historical way, deem that “This is not a formal, conceptual argument, but one related to a historical and practical point” [4] positive libertarian doctrines have too often justified totalitarianism in history.

Since historical way of analysis would relate much analysis of different dynasties and regions in the history, I am not going to manage the argument by this route in this short essay. In the following I will give an outline of Berlin’s opinion about the relationship of positive liberty and totalitarianism. Then, through pointing out Berlin’s logical problems in pulling them together, I will prove that positive liberty, though having a great tendency to totalitarian rules in the past, have no direct causation with totalitarianism.

Berlin’s Two concepts of Liberty

To make everything clear in mind, I will give a short outline of Berlin’s concept of Liberty. Berlin, in his illustrious “Two Concepts of Liberty”, makes clear the concepts of positive and negative liberty, points out the danger of positive liberty and advocates negative liberty and also subsequent pluralism.

He starts by claiming that there are two hundred or even more meanings and interpretations of the word “Liberty”. Yet what attract him are the two major sense of this protean word, namely positive liberty and negative liberty.[5] In the first sense, liberty consists in ‘being one’s own master’ and one is said to be free if s/he is self-governing and directing his or her own life. A person’s autonomy and self-determining is the core of the idea. Thus freedom is concerned with questions like “By whom am I governed?” and “What, or who, is the course of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?” When one has a larger degree of mastering him or herself, he or she is seen as having more positive freedom.[6] “Freedom has also been portrayed in the form of self-realization or self-fulfilment”[7]

In the negative sense of liberty, “Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others” [8] The main points are non-interference and opportunity. Just as Charles Taylor’s words, while positive freedom is always an ‘exercise concept’, negative freedom is usually an ‘opportunity concept’.[9] So the extent of one’s freedom depends on the number of obstacles to plausible choices and activities. When more opportunities and choices are available to us, it means we have more negative freedom.

One may ask how the encouragement of chasing for positive liberty lead to totalitarianism. It is because the cores of both senses of liberty are on personal and individual level. Positive freedom consists in being an individual’s own master while negative freedom, just as Berlin said, encourages opening more doors to people.[10] Thereby what the reason is for Berlin to think that positive liberty would lead to authoritarianism or totalitarianism?

Two Routes from being “Free” to “Unfree”

According to Berlin himself, there are two ways by which positive liberty is turned to be a dangerous tool leading to unfreedom. The first route is idealism in which self is splitted into two. The second route is stemmed from the ideas of rationalism.

The core of positive liberty is self-mastery; a person is free when he can control his own life. But, just as those Platonists and Hegelians said, am I a slave of nature and desire? Everyone must have the experience of recognizing him or herself uncontrollable. This irrational me is largely due to my unlimited desire, wants and passion. If we accept the ideas of idealism, which believe the existence of a ‘real’ me and ‘ideal’ me, the aim of achieving self-mastery must be, therefore, done by sweeping all my desire and wants in order to becoming a higher self. Only by this can I really master myself. However, normally we do not have enough ability to clear all of our internal obstacles for reaching this higher self. So we need to be rigidly disciplined or restricted by someone else. That is, we have to taught and trained by the others temporarily until becoming rational.[11]

Or some may think that becoming a higher self should be done by killing their natural affections and desire by themselves. Just like those ascetics, quietist, stoics and Buddhists, as Berlin suggested, these people retreat to the inner citadel. They may have inner or spiritual freedom, but this does not mean they possess political freedom, which is the main concern of the article.[12]

And most importantly, the higher self would be regarded as something more than individual. It would be seen as a social ‘whole’ of which a person is an element or an aspect only. The society or the entity in which the people live would be thought as the” true” self everyone chases for. Thus person’s actual wishes may be ignored and the representatives of the “real” self would, in the name of helping the others to be rational, establish a totalitarian rule to oppress and torture irrational one.[13]

The above is the first road from positive liberty to totalitarianism. The next route is more or less the same. Rationalists believe ultimate harmony with an ultimate Truth. Elites are responsible for ‘liberating’ the “slaves of desire’ and tell them the right way to Truth. According to Berlin, the road of rationalism to unfreedom could be summarized into four main points:

1. All men have one purpose and that is rational self-direction;
2. The ends of all rational beings must of necessity fit into a single universal and harmonious pattern, and some men are able to discern more clearly than others;
3. All conflict and tragedy is caused solely by the clash of irrational and insufficient reasons. And these are due to immature and undeveloped elements of life on either communal or individual level. Also, they can be avoided among rational people;
4. When all men have been made rational, they will obey the law of their own nature, and they are wholly free.[14]

By the above four points, totalitarians or authoritarian rules, through rationalism, would easily be built. Rationalist, as Berlin said, “…from an ethical doctrine of individual responsibility and individual self-perfection to an authoritarian state obedient to the directives of an elite of Platonic guardians.”[15]

Will Positive Liberty lead to Totalitarianism?

Because of the experience of the danger of combining the ideas of idealism and rationalism, liberty, in its positive sense, is not encouraged by Berlin. “This is almost at the opposite pole from the purposes of those who believe in liberty in the ‘positive’ – self-directive – sense. The former want to curb authority as such. The latter want it placed in their own hands.” [16] Positive liberty will easily lead to monism, which implies totalitarianism. That’s the reason why he advocates negative liberty by which pluralism is the core of human development.

Is there strong logical link between positive liberty and totalitarianism? Though Berlin himself said there is no great logical distance between the two. What he concern is the experience in history. “Yet the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ notions of freedom historically developed in divergent directions not always logically reputable steps, until, in the end, they came into direct conflict with each other” [17] Though historically positive liberty has a great tendency to become so dangerous, we still have to ask the validity of his argument on logical sense. To what extent will this phenomenon appear in the contemporary world? To what extent will it remerge? There are two routes in leading to totalitarianism. Can these two routes link up with positive liberty and totalitarianism?

To what extent will Idealism guide Positive Liberty to Totalitarianism?

Logically and conceptually, idealism is not very likely to turn the positive liberty chaser into an unfree situation. After examining the main and core ideas of the both concepts, we cannot find a direct causality between the two.

First, there is no direction relationship positive liberty and idealism. As Shi Yuankang said, positive liberty does not include any purport in the theory of idealism and rationalism.[18] The core of positive liberty is self-mastery. I am a positive liberty backer does not mean that I agree the splitting of self. The splitting of self is the core of idealism but not positive liberty. The ultimate goal of positive liberty is being of own master and self-governing. A positive libertarian is not determined to believe idealism while obsessing self-mastery.

Second, the acceptance of self-splitting does not imply agreeing with freedom with rationality. Once again, the essence of positive liberty is self-governing. Once this essence is lost or absent, one cannot be regarded as chasing for positive freedom. So even I agree with the splitting of ‘higher self’ and ‘lower self’, namely irrational and rational self, I do not have to sacrifice my lower self for freedom with rationality. My only aim is governing myself, and this including the mastery of my lower self. There are many values and desires other than rationality. Bearing the essence of self-mastery in my mind, though knowing that I myself is irrational, it is not necessary for me to choose rationality as my final life goal.

Third, agree with freedom with rationality is not claim that the same thing is rational for each person. Even if we link up rationality and freedom, it does not mean that we have to agree with monism which leads to totalitarianism. “We can think the different ways to live are rational for different people…” [19] Believing in rationality and self-mastery does not imply monism.
Fourth, supporting freedom with rationality does not mean that people believe the existence of a single thing which is rational for any one. We do believe in monism, which means the existence of a single way of life for everyone. And we also do not believe everyone has only one rational way of life. One is not live for one goal only, and we never know which road is the best life-plan for a rational person.

Finally and most importantly, to identify rationality with freedom of a person does not imply that you are justified in interfering his or her irrational act. From the above we prove that there is no direct relation between positive liberty and idealism. A positive libertarian does not necessarily accept idealism. And most importantly, which I am elaborating in this paragraph, even if one obsesses positive freedom and idealism simultaneously, there is no reason for him to be interfered, restricted, or even controlled. A positive libertarian must place self-mastery as the first position. If one does not believe in idealism, he or she is still a positive libertarian because of his or her insistence of chasing self mastery. Self-mastery cannot be lost. Once he or she gives up this part, one cannot be deemed as a person striving for positive freedom. Thus it is very doubtful for Berlin’s opinion in which chasing for positive liberty will lead to unfreedom.
There is one more extra argument I want to put forth here. In countering against Berlin’s idea in which positive liberty will to large extent lead to authoritarianism, Adam Swift gives a suggestion. He said that in helping or forcing the irrational people to be rational, those elites, instead of establishing an authoritarian rule, can simply provide information and education to help those ‘lower people’ to think in order to promote their autonomy.[20]

However, I think Swift makes a mistake on separating education and political structure. When rational elites want to guide or force those irrationals road to autonomy, the government, and the subsequent inseparable educational system and curriculum, must have the same direction to the same final goal. A totalitarian government will build up schools imparting knowledge which tell people the splendor and greatness of the government’s liberation career. Official ideology then spread out and strengthened. It is the same case if the government is a democratic one. So every education systems herald different ‘Rationality’ coincides with the government’s ‘Rationality’. If this ‘Rationality’ is imposed on a person who against this official thought and that person is not allowed to learn and articulate freely, he is restricted and not self-mastering already. Totalitarian rule does not simply mean oppression and restriction but also on ideological level.[21] On this sense, Swift’s view of promoting education to replace oppression and thereby avoid the establishment of totalitarian rule cannot stand.

In a nutshell, logically there is no strong link between positive liberty and Idealism. And even if there is a person adhering both ideas, as a positive libertarian, there is no reason and force for him to give up his own right of mastering him or herself. So, logically, the first route of Berlin from Freedom to unfreedom to large extent invalid.

To what extent will Rationalism bring us from Freedom to Unfreedom?

In finding the answer of the question asked in this part’s caption, we have to ask again what the relationship is between rationalism and positive freedom. Is positive liberty necessarily linked up with rationalism? Berlin’s four generalization of the view of rationalists are mentioned in the above part in this essay. Berlin must prove there is a strong causality between positive liberty and rationalism to support his argument.
For point one, rationalists believe one true purpose which is rational self-direction. It is very likely for a positive libertarian to obsess this point. They, with the aim of achieving rational self-mastery and self-governing, would to large extent agree with this idea.

Second, rationalists believe that the aims and goals of all rational beings must be fit into a universal and harmonious pattern or mode, and some people may be more able in discerning this than other people. Do positive libertarians certainly accept this view? Definitely not. The backbone of positive liberty is self-mastery. And neither does it deal with the problem of harmony nor the discernment of people. A positive libertarian could hold the view that rationality is not able to dissolve all the problems and conflicts. He or she may also think that it is impossible to reach a harmonious state. Also, chasing for positive liberty does not need to acknowledge the fact that some people are better in recognizing the rationality and some people are not. From the above we know that to large extent a positive libertarian is not necessarily agree with Berlin’s second point

Third, rationalists find that clash of irrational reasons, caused by immature and undeveloped elements in either personal or communal life, is the only source of all conflict and tragedy. And these tragic incidents can absolutely be avoided. There are no determined concepts about source of conflict and its avoidability in the minds of positive libertarians. Thereby, just as the last point, there is no absolute relationship between positive liberty and the view of conflict.

Fourth, it has been said that if all people had been taught and made rational, everyone would naturally abide by the rational law and regulations. On this sense, they are liberated; they are wholly and completely free. People chasing positive liberty do not have to agree with this point on two senses. First, it is not a must for them to believe that a rational person must obey the law naturally. Moreover, rationality does not mean freedom. Mere rationality without self-mastering would not imply being positively free. That’s why there is no reason for a positive libertarian to hold this view.

Finally, same as idealism, even one agree with the ideas of both rationalism and positive liberty, if he or she is a positive libertarian which place self-mastery as essence, this person will not accept the lost of self-governing for the sake of being rational. Thus there is no excuse or pretext for those elites, in the name of ‘helping’ or ‘guiding’ those mediocre people to be rational, seizing the freedom of the others and interfering them.

Conclusion

Through making clear the logical link between positive liberty and totalitarianism, we find that it is to small extent will chasing for positive liberty turn to being restrained. There is no direct relationship between idealism and positive liberty and rationalism and positive liberty. Since idealism and rationalism are two routes or roads which connect positive freedom and authoritarian rule, once we prove that a libertarian do not have to necessarily choose these two routes, we know that it is to small extent for them to be placed in a restricted environment. Moreover, as I have mentioned in the essay, even a positive libertarian is a idealist or a rationalist at the same time, the reason for interference of other people still does not exist.

In ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, Berlin might want to explain the tendency of positive liberty in causing totalitarianism in history. And by this could he advocate negative liberty and the subsequent pluralism he adores. However, we cannot validate the logic of his argument simply because what had happened before. From conceptual and logical analysis, positive liberty to large extent will not lead to totalitarianism.

Bibliography


1. Berlin. I, “Two Concepts of Liberty”, Four Essays on Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).
2. Crowder. G, “From Pluralism to Anti-Utopianism” Liberalism and Value Pluralism (London: Continuum, 2002).
3. Galipeau. C, “Pluralism and the Liberal Political Order” Isaiah Berlin’s Liberalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994).
4. Heywood. A, Political Theory: an introduction (New York: St. Martins Press, 1999).
5. Kamenka. E, ‘Liberty’, R. Goodin, P. Pettit Ed. A companion to contemporary political philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
6. MacCallum. G, “Negative and positive Liberty” Miller ed. Liberty (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991).
7. Swift. A, Political Philosophy: a beginners guide for students and politicians (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 2001).
8. Taylor, Charles, “What is wrong with Negative Liberty” Miller ed. Liberty (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991).
9. 以撒.柏林, 雷敏.亞罕拜格魯, 《以撒柏林對話錄》, 楊孝明譯 (台北: 正中書局, 1994).
10. 石元康, 〈柏林論自由〉,《當代自由主義理論》(上海: 三聯書店, 2000).

[1] G. MacCallum, “Negative and positive Liberty” Miller ed. Liberty (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991), 100-122.
[2] Charles Taylor, “What is wrong with Negative Liberty” Miller ed. Liberty (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991), 141-162.
[3] G. Crowder, “From Pluralism to Anti-Utopianism” Liberalism and Value Pluralism (London: Continuum, 2002), 90-97.
[4] Claude Galipeau, “Pluralism and the Liberal Political Order” Isaiah Berlin’s Liberalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994),120.
[5] I. Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”, Four Essays on Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 121.
[6] Ibid., 121-122.
[7] A. Heywood, Political Theory: an introduction (New York: St. Martins Press, 1999), Chapter 9, 263
[8] I. Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”, Four Essays on Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 122.
[9] See Charles Taylor, “What is wrong with Negative Liberty” Miller ed. Liberty (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991), 141-162.
[10] 以撒.柏林, 雷敏.亞罕拜格魯, 《以撒柏林對話錄》, 楊孝明譯 (台北: 正中書局, 1994), 51.
[11] I. Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”, Four Essays on Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 131-134.
[12] Ibid., 135-137.
[13] Ibid., 131-134.
[14] Ibid., 154.
[15] Ibid., 152.
[16] Ibid., 166.
[17] Ibid., 132.
[18] 石元康, 〈柏林論自由〉,《當代自由主義理論》(上海: 三聯書店, 2000), 23.
[19] A. Swift, Political Philosophy: a beginners guide for students and politicians (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 84.
[20] Ibid., 78.
[21] See the five factors justify the word ‘totalitarian’ of Eugene Kamenka ‘Liberty’ in R. Goodin, P. Pettit Ed. A companion to contemporary political philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 632.

Can an undemocratic government be legitimate?

This is the mid-term paper of GPA 1095 "Issues of Political Philosophy", guided Mr. Chow Po Chung

Legitimacy has been an important word in the discipline of political philosophy and social science. And it is undoubtedly one of the vital concepts in justifying a government or a state. It is usually defined as rightfulness, by achieving which one authority’s act can be justifiable and rightful. “Where power is acquired and exercised according to justifiable rules, and with evidence of consent, we call it rightful or legitimate” [1]

One dealing with the legitimacy of a democratic government is much easier than that of an undemocratic government today. It is because a contemporary recognized democratic society, with its policies and elections according to law, regular shifting of the power holders in accordance with the orientation of the majority and the public discussion sphere, fulfill the condition of achieving legitimacy. On the other hand, undemocratic governments (e.g. Communist states) usually direct her fellow people in one official ideology. The whole society is a single ‘enterprise’ and the authority is legitimated in goal-rational terms.[2] Because of the lack of flow of information and difficulty in determining whether a goal is legitimate or not, the legitimacy of an undemocratic state has always been a controversy.

In the following paragraphs, I will start with clarifying the meanings and definitions of undemocratic government and legitimacy. Through examining the features and characteristics of them, I find that an undemocratic government cannot be legitimate. There is a certain relationship between democracy and legitimacy. A power holder cannot be regarded as legitimate without democracy. Only democracy satisfies the structure and significance of the concept of normative legitimacy.

What is undemocratic government?

For finding the answer of the question “Can an undemocratic government be legitimate?” we should start with asking ourselves what an undemocratic government is and what the criteria of achieving legitimacy are. Here I will begin with finding the meaning of the former.

What is undemocratic government? To know what a negative word signifies, the best way is to look up the meaning of its opposite. It means that we should know what democracy is. If a government or an authority does not reach the standard of democracy, we may define her as undemocratic.

From the dictionary definition, the word “Democracy” signifies “system of government by the whole people of a country, esp. through representatives whom they elect.” [3] However, it is not the end. We find that immediately we would be troubled by several questions. What is the meaning of people? What is the meaning of rule? Does “people” mean the whole adult population?[4] There are so many forms of democracy, how can we recognize what a democratic government is?

Among the enormous complicated forms and ideas, it is feasible to recognize some common features and criteria of democracy. The most widely used definition is given by Robert A. Dahl. In accordance with Dahl, there are at least five standards: Effective participation, all members of the association must have equal and effective opportunities to participate in presenting their views about an issue or a policy; Voting Equality, everyone must have an equal and effective chance to vote when the decision is made, and all votes must be regarded as having the same weight when counting the votes; Enlightened understanding, every member must have equal and effective opportunities for understanding and knowing relevant alternative policies or choices and their consequences or results; Control of the Agenda, Each member does have the opportunity in deciding what matters, businesses or issues to be put on the agenda and how they are put, that is, everyone has the chance of shaping the size, the form and the content of the agenda by different but equal ways; Finally, Inclusion of adults, that is “All, or at any rate most, adult permanent residents should have the full rights of citizen that are implied by the first four criteria” and all people are treated as political equal.[5]
Now we know what the basic criteria of democracy are, and this enable us to determine what undemocratic means. A democratic government must have the above five essential standards, without any one of which a government would be recognized as undemocratic. For instance, people in a state have the chance to participate effectively in discussing some political issues (Effective participation is fulfilled), but some people from a specific class do have more effectiveness and influential votes when they show their hands in the election (Voting equality is not achieved), then this government or association would still be deemed as undemocratic.

In the contemporary world, there are a lot of countries and governments can be judged as undemocratic. For instance, China (PRC), Singapore, Cuba, North Korea, some Middle East countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan are not thought as democratic because they do not satisfy the five standards of democracy. HKSAR, with the existence of an open discussion, participation sphere in politics issues and election of Legco, cannot be reside in the realm of democratic governments because of her lack of voting equality. They cannot have an equal vote in determining their political reforms and issues in many other aspects.


What is Legitimacy?

It would be even more troublesome in defining and elucidating the word “Legitimacy”. It can be defined as “the right to rule”, defined as “the belief in the rightfulness of a state, in its authority to issue commands, so that the commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest, but because they are believed to have moral authority, because subjects believe that they ought to be.” [6] That means one cannot simply use the concept of Power to justify the existence of an authority or a government. Power of issuing commands and carrying policies is the ability to get things done and Legitimacy is the “ascribed entitlement” to exercise the power. So, political authority is the combination of political power and legitimacy[7]. The former provides ruler the ability to rule while the latter give ruler a moral foundation.

There are at least two main streams used by Political philosophers and social scientists respectively. The most authoritative and influential scholar in drawing the border line of the word “legitimacy” is Max Weber. Weber, as a sociologist, did not reject or defend any views or conducts of a society in a particular context. What he concerned is the reason why a state is regarded as legitimate. To Weber, “There can be orientation toward valid authority even where its meaning (as generally understood) is not necessarily obeyed. The probability that the authority is to some extent held as a valid norm can also have its effect on behavior even where its meaning is evaded or deliberately violated.” [8] Thus his “Belief Theory” believed that the society is value-free and he what his “legitimacy” is a descriptive concept.

Weber did well in defining a descriptive “legitimacy”, but this definition contributes very little if we want to judge or identify the moral or rational basis for an authority. Weber did not provide a normative dimension of “legitimacy”. Through his “Belief Theory”, one can ask and answer the question of “Why is this authority legitimate?” but not “should this authority be legitimate?” He seemed to have ignored some basic or essential values or shard beliefs among the people. People’s belief is not totally determined by the holder of power. In my view, the condition and the nature of the society must be the generalization between the power holder and the subordinate. I do not mean they share the same power or they can bargain with each other equally. The generalize condition or state here means that each one have preserved some basic and essential principles or values. They may be suppressed or punished greatly and facing inequalities in social or religious aspects, they may be very angry, but they won’t overthrow the authority once they preserve the rights or something else derived from their basic values. Just as David Beetham said, “we are making the assessment of the degree of congruence, or lack of it, between a given system of power and beliefs, values and expectations that provide its justification. We are not making report on people’s belief in legitimacy”[9]

Besides criticizing Weber, David Beetham suggested that we should manage the topic “Legitimacy” in a normative approach advocated by political philosophers. He built up a normative structure of legitimacy. Through achieving all the criteria of the structure suggested, one authority can be deemed as legitimate. In the following I am going to use a normative structure of legitimacy based on Beetham’s suggestion for finding the answer of the raised question. It would be useless to use Weber’s descriptive approach to justify the legitimacy of a government as all the existing states are “legitimated” in the eyes of Weber. I am going to place undemocratic government under the structure of normative legitimacy. The compatibility of the definitions of two concepts would be the key of solving the problem.
The configuration of the normative structure of legitimacy

There are three distinct levels or elements in the normative structure or legitimacy. An authority or a government can be said to be legitimate if:

1. it conforms to established rules
2. the rules can be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate
3. there is evidence of consent by the subordinate to particular power relation[10]

The first one is the conformity with the established rules or regulation. There must be some existed understanding, which is tacit or explicit before the establishment of an authority or government. Every power struggler knows the rules of the game. It provides a legitimate way of seizing the power. Thus they must follow the written or unwritten rules derived by the conventions and customs in that particular circumstance to be legitimate in the process of becoming the power holder. Those who acquire the power out of the rules are illegitimate.

The second one is the justification of the authority in terms of shared beliefs. To gain the validity, an authority must have to be justified by some basic common interests and views. The policies, structures and the forming of the power must serve a recognizably general interest.

When dealing with this concept one has to bear in mind that no society has a perfect uniform beliefs. But it is believed there must be some basic common shares of beliefs among the people living in the same sphere. Without satisfying this minimum essence of understanding among the dominant and the subordinate, rules of the government will be in lack of legitimacy.

The third one “…involves the demonstrable expression of consent on the part of the subordinate to the particular power relation in which they are involved, through actions which provide evidence of consent.” [11] Through giving this “demonstrable expression of consent”, which play the role of a subjectively binding force, moral and normative component will be inbreathed into the power relation. And this consent also has a symbolic and declaratory force representing the subordinate and also the minorities. Without a system embodying this spirit of express consent, an authority will be considered as illegitimate.[12]

On the form of expressed consent, Beetham thought that consent should be analyzed from a different view in accordance with culture and context of that society. He said:

“Now some theorists would argue that consent is a distinctively modern component or condition of legitimacy…it therefore cannot be relevant to an understanding of legitimacy in other historical societies…What counts as consent, therefore, and from whom it is required to confer legitimacy on the powerful, is itself a culturally specific matter, determined by the conventions of a given society, rather than a definable absolutely.”[13]

It is clear that Beetham’s structure is contradictory. If the legitimacy structure is normative, then the criteria and the standard in building up the structure should also be normative. On the one hand, he said that legitimacy should not be seen under different circumstances as Weber suggested. On the other hand, he built up a normative structure based on a descriptive “expressed consent” which is analyzed under different cultures. Normative means what we ought to do. Thus Beetham falls in an antilogy. My view is that only election can embody the spirit of expressed consent of every adult. Even with active political participants, open discussion sphere and an enlightened or frank government, the consent would not be expressed without election because the government may ignore the participants through holding the power.

As a result, my normative structure would regard election as the only way to achieve the aim of “expressed consent”. Some may ask it would be difficult for us to analyze historical authority as there were seldom governments holding elections which allow most adults vote. And we cannot say that there are only a few of governments like Athens or Rome is legitimate. In my opinion, most of the governments in the history are not legitimate from the normative views. Those authorities did not provide basic rights and welfare and they were overthrown only by revolutions or rebellions. I deem that we can say those authorities were regard as legitimate in the eyes of descriptive legitimacy researchers and the government’s followers at that time but not normative backers.

Undemocratic government must have to succeed in reaching the above three standards simultaneously to be regarded as legitimate normatively. One cannot say an undemocratic authority normatively legitimate if she fulfills the first two level of the structure. A legitimate power holder must conform to established rules, be justifiable by common beliefs and give her people chances for expressing demonstrable consent.


Can undemocratic government be legitimate?

Now we can answer the question by placing an undemocratic government under the normative legitimate structure by linking the features of the two concepts. I will give my explanations in the following paragraphs.

1. Can undemocratic government conform to established rules?

An undemocratic government can conform to established rules. Here rules are not necessarily something written. And in the period of disorder or anarchy like the period of ChunQiuZhanGuo (春秋戰國), winning in the fighting and battles, using diplomatic stratagems and policies and assassinations are the established rules of the power game. Of course there are many examples of am undemocratic power holder get his rule through an illegitimate way. But we cannot deny that the established rule is not normative rules. It is only established by the society and there is no guarantee that it must be normative. So an undemocratic authority is able to be legitimate through following the ways of coming into the power derived from the established conventions and customs which may not be normative. And so that undemocratic government can satisfy the first level of the normative legitimate structure.

2. Can the rules of an undemocratic government be justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate?

An undemocratic government can also satisfy this criterion. The common beliefs shared by the people can be divided into two main parts. First is the authoritative source of the rules. This source can be analyzed externally and internally. Every society is guided by ideology derived under specific condition and environment. For instance, middle Ages’ people believed in divine command but people today are convinced by scientific doctrine. This is the external source guiding the beliefs of the people; there are also different internal sources in different periods. Society in the past relied on elder and cultural leaders while people today see their representatives as the internal source of the authoritative ruler. On this aspect, an undemocratic government with no effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agendas and inclusion of the adults can also meet this criterion. It is because this common belief and interest is largely stemmed from the ideology, philosophy and technology in that specific period. Although there may have cases that undemocratic government may not be compatible with authoritative source of rule in that period. But it is undeniable that either a democratic government or an undemocratic one may be able to satisfy this criterion.

For the content of the rules, an undemocratic government can also reach the standard. The main point is that the policies and achievements made by the authority must have to demonstrate the common interest of different people in different class or associations. Also the authority has to distinguish the dominant from the subordinate. This differentiation ensures the dominance of the superior and the subordination of the inferior through determining qualified and unqualified from the throne. An undemocratic government, though without election, can still satisfy this requirement by giving a public discussion sphere and actively consulting her subordinates.

It is clear that undemocratic government does not equal to tyranny or dictatorial rule which totally or completely ignore voices and opinions of the people. Thus she can be justifiable by the common beliefs and interests once she does have effective participation and enlightened understanding. Undemocratic government can be very open and frank. She can welcome all the ideas from all the citizens and endure different –isms existed in her land. By generalizing these beliefs and interests shared by the people in different classes, she can be justifiable by people’s beliefs externally and internally.

3. Can undemocratic government give evidence of consent by the subordinate to particular power relation?

From the last paragraph, I said that an undemocratic power could be justifiable by the common beliefs and interests through being more enlightened. But this does not mean that she can be normatively legitimate. She cannot be regarded as normatively legitimate because she would not be able to give chances for the people to express consent. Equal Voting is the only way to express demonstrable consent. Without voting equality in the election, the government, with enlightened understanding and effective participation, is still undemocratic. And without election, the government can simply maintain the obedience of the people or keeping the law by coercion.

For instance, HKSAR government allows open and frank public sphere for discussion. And she will carry out after fully consultation and debate. But without voting, these consultations and debates cannot be seen as expressed consent but only some civil activities. These civil activities, without one man one vote, can still be ignored by the government. It is not a must for the power holder to listen to them. Article 23 is a good example in proving this. Moreover, adults are not able to have the control of the agenda in a undemocratic land. In my view, voting equality, control of the agenda and the inclusion of adults are more important in the concept of democracy, the reason is that the other two elements (effective participation, enlightened understanding) are some non-institutional and voluntary practices. A government can give these things to the people. But only voting equality in election and the control of the agendas do have binding force in through telling the power holder the truth and give the articulation opportunity to the people through which they can give a real demonstrable expressed consent. From the above, an undemocratic government cannot satisfy the above level of the normative structure.


Conclusion

Undemocratic government cannot be legitimate. Through examining the characteristics of the concept of democracy and normative legitimacy, we find that no matter how open and kind a non-democratic government is, her people won’t be able to demonstrate the expressed consent. An undemocratic government can conform the established rules and be justifiable by the common beliefs of the people under that particular and specific circumstance in the history determined by that condition and environment. Nevertheless, in my opinion, the aim of getting expressed consent cannot be achieved without equal voting and control of the agenda by every adult. Without fair and equal election, effective participation and enlightened understanding can only be regarded as the gift given by the power holder. And the power holder does not have to listen to you.

Undemocratic government cannot be legitimate for its omission of the vital features of being normative legitimacy. I strongly believe that only popularly elected government which protects individual rights; primarily civil liberty, legal equality and political freedom suggested by Kantian can be seen as normative legitimate.[14]


Bibliography


1. Alagappa, Muthiah. (1995) Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The quest for moral authority: Stanford University Press.
2. Beetham, David. (1991) The Legitimation of Power: Basingstoke: Macmillan.
3. Brich, Anthony H. (2001) The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy: London; New York: Routledge .
4. Dahl, Robert. (1998) On Democracy: Yale University Press.
5. Rigby. T.H (1982) Political Legitimation in Communist States: Macmillan.
6. Rosen, Allen. D (1993) Kant’s Theory of Justice: Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
7. Oxford Advanced Learner’s English-Chinese Dictionary (Extended 4th edition) (1999).
8. Weber, Max. (1962) Basic Concepts in Sociology / Translated and with an introd. By H. P. Secher.: New York: Philosophical Library.

[1] David Beetham “Towards a Social-scientific Concept of Legitimacy.” Legitimation of Power, P.3 Macmillan 1991
[2] T. H. Rigby “Introduction: Political Legitimacy, Weber and Communist Mono-organizational Systems.” Political Legitimation in Communist States, P.12, Macmillan 1982
[3] Oxford Advanced Learner’s English-Chinese Dictionary (Extended 4th edition), Oxford University Press, 1999
[4] Anthony H. Birch, The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy, 2001, P.71
[5] Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy, Yale University Press, 1998, P.37-38
[6] Barker, Political Legitimacy, P.11
[7] Anthony H. Birch, The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy, P.58
[8] Max Weber, Basic Concepts in Sociology, Citadel Press (1962), P.72
[9] David Beetham, P.11
[10] Beetham, David, P.16
[11] Beetham, David, P. 18
[12] Beetham, David, P.16-19
[13] Beetham, David, P.19
[14] Allen D. Rosen, Kant’s Theory of justice, P.115-116

個人傳記的歷史責任 - 評《石點頭 – 鐘逸傑回憶錄》

此乃 UGC 256R "香港史" 的讀書報告

明朝年間，無名著《石點頭》十四卷，後於光緒年間被改名《醒世第二奇書》，標明由天然痴殷所著，並由馮夢龍作序。書中一卷成一個故事，辛辣地諷刺貪官污吏和不察民情的九五之尊。[1]

今日，港英時代的布政司鐘逸傑爵士以《Feeling the Stone》作為其個人傳記的書名，記載他了解和探索中國的歷程。書名被譯者陶傑故意曲譯為《石點頭》。用了相同的書名，內容卻沒有半點苛刻的口誅筆伐，取而代之的是作者對中英兩國和香港這塊小土地的愛護之情。

正如作者於〈前言〉所講，本書不是一冊戰後的香港史，也沒有甚麼驚人內幕帶給讀者。鐘爵士甚至說這不是一本自傳或是生活編年史[2]。它只是一本紀錄一位在港工作多年，站在香港政治最前線的洋人高官的回憶錄。像譯者之言「（這本書）重點在於經驗和重點，他把上半生的閱歷，為讀者沏成一杯大吉嶺的紅茶，品茗竟日，令人齒頰間仍閃動著南太平洋的夕曛」[3]想尋找經典歷史事件的內幕，或是想以此書作為參考，研究香港政治歷史的讀者，恐怕要失望而回了。

「一九四五年一月，十七歲的我，還是個只為穿上一件鑲金扣子的齊膝漂亮軍裝大衣而得意洋洋的學生，離開了南丘靜謐的叢林、村莊，和令人心矌神怡的丘陵。火車發出尖銳的聲響，在寒冷的冬夜裡搖搖晃晃地行駛，經過昏黃陰暗的車站，為了迷惑入侵的軍隊，車站的名字被抹去了。直到第二天，才抵達戰雲密佈的、灰濛濛、冷冰冰的赫爾，人都累壞了」[4]

這是全書的序幕。缺乏震撼人心的機密資料，作為一部半文學作品，《石點頭》的文字仍然可觀。修讀古英語語法的作者在文字中仍流露出戰前牛津古雅的儒氣。陶傑的翻譯除保留原著的神韻之外，更多添一份中國的古典味。明顯和其他同類著作大不相同。

在內容上，《石點頭》無「料」可「爆」。只有作者對一些事一些人的個人觀感經歷。和李敖的自傳相近，鐘爵士用了反回憶錄的手法（Anti-Memoirs）[5]。把個人傳記和當時的歷史放在一起，詳人所略，略人所詳，既表現個人獨特的風格，亦展示出人、歷史與時代三者錯綜複雜的關係。中英談判、政制改革、七三年初訪中國、尤德爵士之死…所交代的除了作者的個人觀感和少量對現場的真實刻劃之外，其餘的資料幾乎都是該年代的人所耳熟能詳的，在當時的報紙也可以輕易找到。故此，不少論者均認為此書參考價值不大，索然無味。[6]

然而，我認為不能單從此點出發評價此書。《石點頭》的價值不是來自它的參考功能。我們從作者的序言可得到點線索：

「我希望有更多的人能讀到這本書，而不僅是在香港住過或仍在此生活的人。我希望他們讀到一些章節時會心生趣，也樂於解讀香港這片小天地…今天，香港政府在中國政府的懷抱裡努力尋求身份，管治更是維艱，各種意外及不幸也帶來了緊張、焦慮和拼勁…可以這麼說，對於全世界那些想和中國一起生活，工作，並從中獲得滿足的人來說，現在香港遍地都是機會」[7]

這本書的意義不是幫助香港史學家解讀歷史之謎。作者是希望以自己的生活故事和工作體驗，勾起港人往日困難但美好的生活回憶，減少導致香港今日社會分化，人心動盪的戾氣。回歸七年，金融風暴擊破了經濟泡沫神話、八萬五政策推倒了樓市、教育改革朝令夕改、SARS橫行、政制改革停滯不前，國安條例和其後的七一大遊行更把港人的憤怒推向頂點。每天都是負面的頭條，不少傳媒更嘩眾取寵，煽情地加劇社會分化。《石點頭》由一個香港黃金時代下的殖民地高官所撰，在香港千瘡百孔之際推出。鐘爵士刻意在內容上對容易引起負面猜測的政治事件淡化，甚至略而不述，披上自己個人感覺的外衣，證明作者寫書的目的不是為史學家提供一個填補空白的文本。

作者不是為記錄而作書，而是為未來而作書。最後一章〈天氣後告〉中所載的全是鼓勵香港人的說話，重申回歸後「一國兩制」得以落實，肯定香港前景將會更好。在其他的文章中，作者也不斷重提香港昔日與中國緊密的關係，甚至透過描述中英政府談判和七十年代訪問封閉的中國的詳情，意圖重構歷史，以一新角度詮釋事件，配以個人作為中港權威的評論，為政府的政策作「補述」。在第三十四章〈塵埃落定〉，作者如此評價九七後的社會狀況：

「然四方八面都有悲觀的揣測，有的西方媒體和政治評論員，甚至擔心　『紅色』中共接管和解放軍進駐，會破壞香港一百五十年殖民統治所建立的一切，但是回歸後的香港街頭，看上去與回歸前沒甚麼兩樣…」

「…早在一九九七年，亞洲經濟不穩的警告訊號已經出現…香港曾享有長期的經濟增長，樓價更攀升到不合理水平…但政府毅然出手，很有技巧地保住了港元…」

「後來斷定出了禽流感…接下來政府大規模屠殺雞、鴨、鵝、鵪鶉…（這次經經驗有利政府於二ｏｏ一年處理另一種禽流感）」

「特首董建華在一九九七年立法局首次發言，宣布他有志一年供應八萬五千個房屋單位的政策…房屋的供應和消費者的信心陷入混亂…自此，房屋政策慢慢轉變…逐漸把土地發展這一重大發展交還給私人公司，大幅減輕未來政府在這方面的承擔…」

「行政長官言出必行，他在二ＯＯ二年六月底特區成立五周年之前，宣布成立新的部長制…官員更了解自己的責任，政府也能日果斷」[8]

以上的引言，比較其他記錄香港回歸後歷史的文本，明顯有大有不同。和其他媒體評論不同，作者似乎頗為欣賞香港政府的管治。入市、流感、八萬五和部長制這些人所共知被批評得體無完膚的事件，在書中竟然成為特區政府值得表揚的治績。回憶錄重個人的心路歷程以及對事件的感覺，對史事作偏頗的評價本來並無不妥。但鐘爵士在書中並不是比較衡量整件事的得失及正面負面之言，再以批判性的思考下定論，讓讀者清楚知道他思想定位的邏輯理據，而是掩蓋另一方面的歷史評論，以自己作為政府高官及中港政事權威之名，毫無考證之下妄下判斷。回憶錄或個人傳記不是私人日記。後者屬個人收藏，作者思想行為如何怪誕，如何不道德，如何隱惡揚善或隱善揚惡也不要緊；惟個人傳記乃公開的著作，所寫所思，均會影響大眾讀者。又公開出售的讀本之中，不少文學作品或政治宣傳刊物均有歪曲社會事實的情況；惟歷史作品不同其他作品，任何人也可以憑個人背後的思想體系評論歷史，但應抱有一種道德價值，評史時應負有傳達正確史實的責任。應比較正反雙方再作評論，顯示個人的思想脈絡，而非掩人耳目，妄作評論。

鐘爵士從政多年，又兼任不少公職。熟知政府內部運作之餘也深入民間。此書以「回憶」為名，作「政治宣傳」為實。明目張膽地把對政府施政作負面評價的一方聲音完全掩蓋。他在序言道「這些記錄和的的記憶一樣不完整。這並不是一本自傳，也不是我們生活的編年史，而是我記憶中最閃亮的一些事情。一定會有人說，『噢，不是這麼回事。』我在此請求他們忍諒」[9]如果只記最閃亮的事，為什麼八萬五做成大量負資產、部長制形同虛設和殺雞事件猶豫不決這些對政府造成巨大傷害的口誅筆伐會被作者「忘記」了呢？是否不夠「閃亮」？相信不少讀者心中有數。

我認為，個人傳記既然以人為本，作者憑藉自身的價值觀和思想，在描繪和引用相關的歷史事件時稍有偏頗和錯失無可厚非，也不會破壞書的可讀性。然而，如果歪曲事實過度，完全忽略傳承正確史觀及史實、教育下一代的責任，甚至欲以歷史權威的身份有目的地對史事作出歪曲事實的解釋和評論，那麼，即使文字如何優美，文章如何可讀，個人傳記只會淪為政治機關教化「愚民」和宣傳的工具。《石點頭》做了一個很好的例子。


[1] 李輝英, 《中國小說史》(1970), 217-218頁, 東亞書局
[2] 鐘逸傑, 《石點頭-鐘逸傑回憶錄》, 陶傑譯, 前言
[3] 《石》,譯後記
[4] 《石》,序幕, 1頁
[5] 李敖, 《李敖自傳與回憶》(1987), 文星書店, 2頁
[6] 如蔡子強在《回憶、失憶、回憶錄》對《石》一書的評論, 見《讀好書》(2004年11-12月), 34頁
[7] 《石》,序言
[8] 《石》, 〈塵埃落定〉
[9] 《石》, 序言

One of the causes of the Chinese Society’s disadvantages - Misconception of “Li”禮

This is the final essay of GES 1610B "Great Books of the World", guided by Prof. Allinson

Introduction

Before the ending of the Ching Dynasty, the Chinese society could be regarded as a Confucius society. Every aspects of the society is imbued with Confucian ideas like “jen” 仁 and “cheng” 正名. For the Confucius embracers, Analects 論語 is the bible. However, many ideas in Analects were not given a clear or detailed interpretations or explanations by K’ung Ch’iu 孔子. As a result, many scholars had been trying to interpret those ideas.

“li” 禮 is one of the two important ideas in Analects ( another one is “jen”). It appears 75 times in the book, but no clear interpretations were given. Thus two main interpretations were suggested by two schools: Instrumentalist and Definitionalist. In the following part, I am going to analyze the misconception of “li” and how it contributes to the ugliness or negative side of the Chinese culture or society.
2 approaches to interpret “Li”

Chinese classical books are different from western classical books. For the westerners, the essence of their life, culture or thinking is logic, accuracy, relations…thus they define their concepts very precisely. But for Chinese, the words or concepts related to amalgamation, natural, love…play the most vital role in their culture and society. The above ideas had been embodied in the words and ideas of the Chinese books.

Analects is the bible of Confucius scholars. However, most of the ideas like “jen” and “li” were not given an accurate and precise interpretation. There are no definitions, K’ung Ch’iu only explain its ideas by giving stories. Antonio S. Cua thinks that there are two reasons behind: First, the assumption of the primacy of practical reason implicit in the Confucian doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action; second, the assumption that reasoned discourse may legitimately appeal to “plausible presumptions”. Thus he thought that “These terms, (Ren, Li and Yi) are much like adjuster words…by the use of which other words are adjusted to meet the innumerable and unforeseeable demands of the worlds upon language.1

As a result, two main approaches, namely Instrumentalist and Definitionalist analysis, were suggested 2. For the former one, “jen” is supposed to be a perfect state of human mind, it is the constitution and essence of the gentlemen. And “li” is only a social restriction or the instrument to embody the principle of “Jen”. “Jen” itself is the ultimate value of the people, and the value of the existence of “li” is to make “Jen” observable. It is derived from the instrumental role of “li” plays with regard to “Jen”. Thus “jen” has a prior value and status and “li” is simply an tool. This concept basically comes from some words in the Analects.

The Master said, “What can a man do with the rites (li) who is not benevolent (jen)? What can a man do with the music who is not benevolent?” (Book 3)

Tzu-hsia asked, “Her entrancing smile dimpling, Her beautiful eyes glancing, Patterns of color upon plain silk. What is the meaning of these lines?”
The Master said, “The plain silk is there first. The colors come afterwards”
“Does the practice of the rites likewise come afterwards?”
The Master said. “It is you, Shang, who have thrown light on the text for me. Only with man like you can one discuss the Odes” (Book 3) 3

From the above, we can know that “li” is only subordinated to “jen”. And Intrumentalists also hold the view that “li” can be changed in different occasions. As a result, “People may be justified in revising or occasionally departing from a rule of “li” if observing the rule does not serve well its function with regard to the “jen” ideal, either generally or on particular occasions”. 4

For the Definitonalists, “li” is not subordinated to the idea “jen”. Their idea form a striking contrast to the Instrumentalists by interpreting “li” as a more important idea than “li”. “jen” cannot stand alone and has an independent value unrelated to “li”, it is not the principles. The fact is “jen” is defined by “li”. Without “li”, there would be no “jen”. Definitionalists think that they are right by viewing the following words in Analects.

Yen Yuan asked about benevolence (jen). The Master said, “To return to the observance of the rites (li) through overcoming the self constitutes benevolence. If for a single day a man could return to the observances of the rites through overcoming himself, then the whole Empire would consider benevolence to be his. However, the practice of benevolence depends on oneself alone, and not the others…(Book12)

The Master said, “Being widely versed in culture but brought back to essentials by the rites a man can, I suppose, be relied upon not to turn against what he stood for”

From the above words, “jen” is not the essence or principles, it is the observance of “li” that has ultimate value. Through observing a person’s “li”, one can find “Jen” or “not jen” of him. Since “li” is the essence but not “jen”, Definitonalists oppose to any changes to “li”. “…the ideal is just generally to observe those rules of “li” that actually exist, this conception of the relation between “Jen” and “li” is conservative in spirit in that it is opposed to any revision of or departure from the existing “li” rules”. 5

Misconception of “li” by the Chinese

We do not know the exact environment of the Han Dynasty when it chose to develop Confucianism only and ignore the other schools. Thus we do not know which interpretation of “li”, which affected the following two thousand years, they favored. But from the Chinese history from the period of K’ung Ch’iu to the last Dynasty Ching, it was clearly that the kings liked Definitionalist interpretation. In Chinese history, “li” was always encouraged by the Government while “jen” was seldom upheld. Thus, the misconception of the idea “li” by the Chinese is that they took the interpretation of the Definitionalists which deem that “li” is more important than “jen”, thus the value and content of “li” could not be changed since the embodiment of “jen” is practiced through the observing of people.

According to T.T. Meadows, “Rebellion” is the movement overthrows the tyranny and “Revolution” is the movement overthrows the political system. And he thought that Chinese was the race which carried the most rebellions but the least revolutions. The only revolution was the revolution to overthrow Chow Dynasty by the nobles 6. Chinese were only willing to overthrow the tyranny but not willing to overthrow the political system (which is a kind of “li”). Chinese just hoped that their new king would be a “jen” king and would carry out “jen” policy, but they had never thought of changing “li” to improve the political system. His ideas in fact indirectly pointed out that Chinese favor “li” more than “jen” (The mind of the people).

The situation changed only until the westerners came. But the resistance of “li” was still great. Chinese were only willing to get the technology and science. Unlike their counterparts in Japan, they were reluctant to give up their original culture or social and political norms. It was not changed until the coming of some social movements like May-forth Movement and New Cultural Movement.

However, even the above movements and some later communist movements could not change the misconception of “li”. They did not contemplate the essence of the meaning of “li”, they simply thought that “li” was old customs and must be eradicated and they had never thought of another interpretation. It implied that the movements’ leaders clung to the notions that “li” was some restrictions which were unchangeable.


A better interpretation – Instrumentalist

Instrumentalist interpretation of “li” would be a better approach to analyze the thought of Confucius. For Confucius, all of the main ideas do not precise definition.

‘It has been justly observed that “for Chinese (Confucius) the idea is not so much to analyze and define concepts precisely as to expand them, to make them suggestive of the widest possible range of meaning…

‘The point does not depreciate the importance of theoretical inquiry, but focuses upon its relevance to the requirements of practice. Since such requirements may vary in time and place, any theory is finally tested in the light of changing human circumstances.’ 7

Under the interpretation of instrumentalists, stories in Analects are metaphors. Confucius did not try to give definition because he deemed that those ideas were just some relations of meanings. “li” and “jen” are some abstract idea without definition, but it does not mean that they do not exist. They exist as different states and form under different circumstances. That’s the essence of Confucian learning. Since the meanings were something implied in the book implicitly, it was not understood until more modern discussion by new Confucian intellectuals.



Misconception of “li” in contributing to the disadvantages of Chinese Society

Chinese misconception of “li” had been contributing to the disadvantages of Chinese society and culture. The Confucian scholars wrongly interpreted that “li” is something could not be changed and fixed. Since the Chinese life and culture since the period of Han Dynasty had been dominated by the Confucius ideas, this misconception had been affecting different aspects or fields in China.

There are two main disastrous effects to the Chinese customs and tradition brought by the misconception of “li”. First, it implicitly became the main obstacle in preventing the politician or scholars from encouraging the changing or transformation of the Chinese political or social forms. “li” was unchangeable, any reforms must not be deviated from the route of “li”. For example, Sung Dynasty’s and Ching Dynasty’s reforms were failed because of the struggle between the Conservative and New Party over the matter of touching the “li”. Conservative party usually used the pretext of “not li” to get rid of the reforms of the New Party. After the May-Forth Movement, the Chinese had never though of reconsidering the meaning of “li”, they simply devoted their effort in eradicating “li”. From Han to the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese had been bounded by a fixed “li”. This fixed “li” played a role of a main obstacle and stumbling block in affecting the developments and modernization of China.

Second, it led to the falseness and externalism of Chinese. Since “jen” had to be observed by the expression of “li”, for avoiding being said as not “jen”, Chinese people, no matter are willing or not, had to pretend to be “li” people. The emotions and feelings were suppressed. The overemphasis of “li” led to the ignorance of “jen”. Just as what the Master said ‘What can a man do with the rites who is not benevolent?’(Book3)

Conclusion

Analects, as the most vital books in Chinese culture and academy, bring many advantages to the Chinese people. As a race without a religion in guiding people towards humanity, Confucianism had been playing an irreplaceable role in acting as the spiritual link of the Chinese. It dominated every classes and types of people.

However, its origin was misunderstood by the scholars. Instrumentalists an interpretation was regarded as subordinated to the Definitionalists’. Thus most reforms and chances of modernization were missed. Confucius was even deemed as the killer who suffocates the development of Chinese politics and social forms. Until the New Confucian intellectuals came out, Confucius’ status was redressed.
In the foreseeable future, Confucianism will still dominate the Chinese culture. And the Analects, as a knowledge treasure-house, was still waited for more research.


Reference

1. Antonio S. Cua, The Concepts of Li in Confucian Moral Theory, Understanding the Chinese mind : the philosophical roots / editor, Robert E. Allinson (Hong Kong Oxford University Press, 1989), P. 210

2. Kwong-Loi Shun, Ren and Li in the Analects, Confucius and the Analects : new essays / edited by Bryan W. Van Norden (Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2002), P.56

3. The following quotations of Analects is according to Confucius : the analects / translated by D.C. Lau. (Hong Kong : Chinese University Press, 1992, 2nd ed)

4. See Reference 3, P. 56-58

5. See Reference 3, P.56-58

6. T.T. Meadows, The Chinese and their Rebellions, London, Smith, Elder, 1856

7. See Reference 2, P.56

神話的建構與複製 - 二次大戰的國旗照片

此乃 CRS 2031 "閱讀視覺文化" 期末論文, 導師為彭麗君教授

在《紀實攝影》(Documentary Photography) 一書的初段，作者阿瑟．羅思坦 (A. Rothstein) 引述畫家保羅．德拉羅什 (P. Delaroche) 第一次看到達蓋爾式 (daguerreotype) 相片時說：「從現在起繪畫已經死了！」。自那時起，作為一種與現實 (reality) 距離更近的再現 (representation)，照片很快取代了繪畫，更精確地製作、保存和傳播影像。[1]

這個在視覺文化史上最具革命性的發明，很快被應用在新聞報導上。一篇附上照片作為「證據」的報導，可以大大加強文字的可信性。當文字講及一件與讀者距離很遠，或者是讀者無法想像的事情時，照片的影響力更大。讀者對這件事的記憶，可能最終只會餘下新聞照片所承載的影像。

與安坐家中的讀者距離最遠的地方，是殘酷的戰場。在克里米亞戰爭 (Crimean War,1854-56) ，攝影機第一次出現在戰場上。自此，讀者可以看到從前無法想像的搏鬥場面，看到戰爭中的「真實」。「通過攝影，某事件 － 對那些身在他方、將之視為『新聞』追蹤的人來說 － 變得真實」[2]。第二次世界大戰時，新聞攝影的發展及影響均達到其顛峰。人們會記得羅拔．卡柏 (R. Capa)隨盟軍登陸諾曼第時拍的那幅焦點不準確的照片，但不會記得那天死了多少個士兵。

照片除了使讀者「看」到了「真實」之外，同時也可以震撼人心。美國政府公開日本偷襲珍珠港的照片，煽情效果遠遠比起公佈死傷數字大。照片成為觸動人情感最有效的工具。在敵我分明的戰爭時期，國旗的照片最能做到這個效果。本文的要旨，是透過分析和比較二戰時的數張國旗照片，解釋它們如何激發民眾情感，建構國家的戰爭神話，又它們是如何被再生產。我將會指出，照片的「真實性」在神話建構的過程並不是最重要，最重要的是它的構圖是否能被建立和複製出一個國家神話。


美軍在摺?山上的光榮


一九四五年，美軍在硫磺島之役遭受重大挫折，幾經辛苦，終於攻佔島上最高的摺?山，並在最高點豎立起一支美國國旗。攝影師羅森塔 (J. Rosenthal) 就在美軍把國旗推高那一刻，拍下了一幅名為「硫磺島升旗」(Old Glory Goes Up on Mt. Surbachi, Iwo Jima) 的照片[3]，成為二戰最著名的照片，在同年獲得包括普立茲獎 (Pulitzer) 在內的七個攝影大獎，更被國家攝影記者聯會 (NPPA)在一九九零年選為「最偉大的新聞照片」。[4]

羅思坦指出，「紀實攝影的力量與沖擊源自大眾接受它是目擊現場的攝影者的圖像證據」[5]。但這幅「硫磺島升旗」的由來告訴我們，攝影師是否目擊現場並不是決定新聞照片的「力量與沖擊」的主要因素。根據一名美軍海斯的說法，他們把國旗升起後，狂喜得把它撕成碎片，每人佔一份以作紀念。當羅森塔到達山頂時，他要求補拍一張。於是上尉隨意選了包括海斯在內的另外六名美軍，在羅森塔的編導下拍出這幅照片。一個月後，美國政府為宣傳戰績，選了它在不同的媒體翻印。自此，照片成為美軍在太平洋上勝利的象徵。[6]

羅森塔坦白承認他拍的不是第一支在摺?山上升起的美國旗，但他極力否認做假。他所拍的，是美軍後來想換一支較大的國旗時的情況。我們最終不會知道真相，但我想指出，這幅真實性被質疑的照片，仍能成為經典之作，證明真實性 (authenticity) 不是構成一幅成功的新聞照片的元素。


羅森塔 (J. Rosenthal), 「硫磺島升旗」(Old Glory Goes Up on Mt. Surbachi, Iwo Jima)

神話的由來 ─ 構圖


「硫磺島升旗」並非惟一記錄美軍當日勝利的照片。和「硫磺島升旗」相同地點和主題的照片，還有羅利 (L. Lowery) 的「硫磺島上的第一支旗」 (First Flag at Iwo Jima) 和羅森塔另外一幅「二戰美軍在硫磺島上的旗」 (WWII U.S. Marines Flag Iwo Jima)。它們都屬於美國生活雜誌 (LIFE) 網上版的經典系列。然而，在真實性備受質疑的情況下，「硫磺島升旗」的構圖使它成為家喻戶曉的作品。

羅利 (L. Lowery),「硫磺島上的第一支旗」 (First Flag at Iwo Jima) (圖一)

第一個「硫磺島升旗」優勝的地方，是沒有士兵對著鏡頭。六名士兵都是全心全意的推高國旗，不知道攝影機的存在。在羅利的「硫磺島上的第一支旗」(下簡稱「圖一」)，一名士兵對著鏡頭，察看周圍是否有敵人，做了一個刻意對著鏡頭、裝作勇敢的姿勢，而他的同伴則輕鬆地升上第一支國旗；「二戰美軍在硫磺島上的旗」(下簡稱「圖二」)則是美軍完全勝利後的團體照。團體照使人感覺到攝影師的存在。這已經不是一個炮火連天的戰場，沒有了勇敢冒死升旗的海軍陸戰隊。在國旗前慶祝勝利的軍人並不勇敢。他們只是軍紀鬆懈，操練廢弛的小兵。而「硫磺島升旗」所顯示的是不顧一切的勇往直前的軍人。軍人沒有望向鏡頭，也增加了這幅圖片的可信性 ─ 這是漫天戰火的情況下拍攝的。

羅森塔,「二戰美軍在硫磺島上的旗」 (WWII U.S. Marines Flag Iwo Jima) (圖二)

第二個使「硫磺島升旗」成為神話的要素，是國旗。圖一的國旗，是小旗。它小得甚至比不上美國人掛在屋外花園的國旗。這樣小的國旗，在大戰役中升起，根本不值一提，甚至不用數個士兵幫忙。很明顯，這支小旗只需一個人單手提著，圖中另外幾個士兵是多餘的。這種構圖使人覺得照片不是真實的，只是一幅由攝影師作導演，士兵作演員的的電影海報；圖二的國旗非常大，但是它是靜止的國旗。已經升起的國旗，配合相中笑容燦爛的軍人，根本沒有紀實照片的感覺。「硫磺島升旗」的國旗，沒有圖二的大。在戰況劇烈的情況下，士兵根本沒有能力隨身帶這樣大的國旗，但太小的卻不能振奮士氣。另外一個重要的地方，是這支國旗是處於上升的階段。如果國旗尚未升起，國家的象徵未出現在戰場，根本沒有甚麼值得興奮；如果國旗已經聳立在摺?山，效果便會和圖二一樣，戰火已經平息了，一切緊張刺激的氣氛也會消失。

最後，「硫磺島升旗」的天和地也有加強士氣的作用。天空在「硫磺島升旗」中佔了很大的比重 ─ 高高在上的天，然後是正在上升的國旗，最後是默默工作的勇敢軍人和他們腳下的廢墟。軍人們踏著的，是快將被擊敗的日本人的土地。不顧生死的軍人，把國旗推上天空 ─ 一大片代表正義，勝利的天空。這樣，照片更加神聖，因為它加上了道德含義 ─　美國不單是勝利的一方，更是正義之師。事實上，「硫磺島升旗」的英文原名“Old Glory Goes Up on Mt. Surbachi, Iwo Jima”已道出國旗所帶來的光榮 (glory)，在摺?山上升起 (goes up)。


國家神話的複製


吉芬 (M. Griffin)曾經指出，「長留人心的戰爭影像，不是那些真實地刻劃戰場上生與死的的照片，也不是那些告訴我們歷史資料的照片，而是那些作為文化和國家神話象徵的照片」[7]。「硫磺島升旗」是印證這句話的最佳例子。用羅蘭．巴特 (R. Barthes) 的神話分析，表義 (denotation)是六名士兵在山上推高一支國旗這一個動作本身 (即使這個動作可能只是攝影師重構的)；深義 (connotation) 則是作為正義化身的美軍在戰事上和道德上的勝利。深義發揮作用，令讀者覺得照片帶來的訊息是理所當然的，抽空了表義，使這幅真實受到爭議的照片成為神話 (myth) ─ 一個國家勝利的神話。

照片在主觀建構了一個「真實」之後，日後媒體開始根據這個「真實」為材料，建構它們自己的故事，複製 (reproduce) 這個國家神話。史提芬．史匹堡 (S. Spielberg) 就是根據卡柏的照片來重建雷霆救兵 (Saving Private Ryan) 的搶灘場面，並宣稱那是真實而可信。[8]「硫磺島升旗」作為史上最偉大的戰爭照片之一，當然也有不少「複製品」。羅森塔鏡頭下的一幕在尊榮 (J. Wayne) 的經典戰爭電影「血戰硫磺島」 (Sand In Iwo Jima) 末段重現。但是，即使羅利的「硫磺島上的第一支旗」(圖一) 見證了第一支小國旗的升起，而羅森塔也承認他的照片只是第二支國旗，但電影仍然把羅森塔那六個軍人的英勇行為當成第一支國旗升起的一刻。即是，原本應該是第二時間升起的那支國旗，在神話複製到電影的過程中，成為了第一支。這張照片，作為國家神話，代表了硫磺島上的一切。其他東西，包括當中涉及的事實和數字已經不再重要。事實上，這幅照片更被刻成紀念碑，放在美軍的紀念公園[9]。神話隨著影像被不停複製及再生產。


結語


本文透過比較，分析「硫磺島升旗」這張充滿爭議相片的在構圖上如何壓倒其他相同主題的照片，被國家選中，成為國家神話的象徵符號。因為與現實接近，照片的真實性經常不經懷疑地被讀者全盤接受。新聞攝影及其紀實風格更被認為是最接近現實世界的拍攝手法。當中牽涉到關於再現 (representation) 的問題往往被受忽略。攝影者主體、照片拍攝時的背景及取景的用意等等，都是我們在觀看一幅照片時值得留意和反思的地方。

在本文的例子，「硫磺島升旗」以其影像上的可塑性，被挑選為國家神話。影像被複製到不同的媒體的同時，神話亦隨之而散播。在再生產的過程中，真實本身甚至被人們遺忘了。在這個影像氾濫的複製時代，探討真實變得更為困難，正如本雅明 (W. Benjamin) 在《攝影小史》的第一句所言：「攝影的濫觴時期，煙霧飄杳，但並不比籠罩在印刷術起源時代的迷霧濃」[10]


參考書目


1. 羅思坦 (Arthur Rothstein) 著, 李文吉譯: 《紀實攝影》(Documentary Photography) (廣西師範大學, 2005)
2. 蘇珊. 桑塔格 (Susan Sontag) 著, 陳耀成譯: 《旁觀他人之痛苦》(Regarding the Pain of Others) (麥田, 2005)
3. 展江等著: 《正義與勇氣II 世界百名傑出戰地記者列傳》(海南, 2000)
4. 本雅明 (Walter Benjamin) 著, 許綺玲, 林志明譯: 《迎向靈光消逝的年代: 本雅明論藝術》(廣西師範大學, 2004)
5. B. Brennen & H. Hardt ed., Picturing the Past: media, history, and photography (University of Illinois, 1999)

[1] 羅思坦著, 李文吉譯: 《紀實攝影》(Documentary Photography) (廣西師範大學, 2005), p.3
[2] 蘇珊. 桑塔格著, 陳耀成譯: 《旁觀他人之痛苦》(Regarding the Pain of Others) (麥田, 2005), p.32
[3] 這幅照片有多個中文譯名, 如《國旗升起在蘇里巴奇山》, 本文取紀實攝影一書李文吉的譯名
[4] M. Griffin, “The Great War Photographs: Constructing Myths of History and Photojournalism”, Picturing the Past: media, history, and photography, edited by B. Brennen & H. Hardt (University of Illinois, 1999), p. 143
[5] 羅思坦著, 李文吉譯: 《紀實攝影》(Documentary Photography) (廣西師範大學, 2005), p.89
[6] 展江等著: 《正義與勇氣II 世界百名傑出戰地記者列傳》(海南, 2000), p. 649
[7] M. Griffin, “The Great War Photographs: Constructing Myths of History and Photojournalism”, Picturing the Past: media, history, and photography, edited by B. Brennen & H. Hardt (University of Illinois, 1999), p.123
[8] 蘇珊. 桑塔格著, 陳耀成譯: 《旁觀他人之痛苦》(Regarding the Pain of Others) (麥田, 2005), p.91
[9] 參見http://www.webtravels.com/iwojima/
[10] 本雅明著, 許綺玲, 林志明譯: 《攝影小史》, 《迎向靈光消逝的年代: 本雅明論藝術》(廣西師範大學, 2004), p. 3

人和空間 - 重繪九龍城寨的地圖

此乃CRS 2016 "現代性與都市文化" 期末論文, 導師為李歐梵教授

「這是一個混雜的空間、一個不容易一概而論的空間、一個看來可怕但又那麼多人嘗試正常地生活下去的一個空間。就像香港。」[1]


這是香港城市詩人也斯心目中的九龍城寨。城寨多被外人認定是一個黃賭毒的三不管地帶，入面的居民都不敢告訴人他們是住在城寨的。但也斯的一位朋友卻以自己的生活歷史為榮，令也斯把香港和城寨連結起來－城寨就是香港的縮影：它們的居民都是住在被邊緣化的混雜的環境，又都積極地向人解釋自己的住處不是這麼可怕，自己的家是一個令人引以自豪的地方。正如也斯所言，城寨是一個「我們的空間」。

官方的大論述，往往把我們歷史中最珍貴的生活點滴埋沒。城寨在殖民者和中國大陸的眼中，單單是一個歷史問題。一九八七年，香港政府宣佈將於一九九一年清拆城寨，並在原址興建公園，中方隨即發出聲明表示充份理解。就這樣，城寨居民在夾縫中的生活歷史，將隨著這個近百年的畸形社區煙消雲散。家園和街坊，被政府以略高於市價的賠償金換購了。

有關城寨的研究，多集中圍繞城寨而引發的中英外交風波，或者清末民國時城寨居民的生活。然城寨並不是因為這些歷史而在香港人回憶中留下烙印。城寨的重要性，是它在五十至八十年代的發展高峰時期，為香港人和城寨人提供多元化而又便宜的服務，以及當中難以令人忘懷的社區生活。正因它是一個三不管的地方，沒有官方權力主導發展和操控，它的社區文化特別混雜多元。

可惜的是，因為城寨本身的凌亂和缺乏有志獨闖城寨的研究者，有關城寨社區文化的歷史記載少得可憐。而幾份較有參考價值的研究則太過片面零碎，或者把城寨過於他者化，或者只有口述歷史而缺乏條理。我沒有經歷過城寨時期，寫此文的目的，正是希望透過結合整理各種文本的不同層面，重新繪製出一幅九龍城寨的地圖。
城中之城

城寨本為清廷在九龍區的一個防守要地。一九八九年，英國和清朝訂立《展托香港界址專條》，佔領新界。為了方便日後收回新界及管理當地的華人，清朝保有城寨的管理權。但其後英國認為城寨妨礙香港的防備，乃單方面驅逐城寨內的清朝官員。從此，城寨既不是中國的土地，也不是英國的領地。[2]

一塊只有六英畝半的地，卻有二三十條小巷，高峰時住了四萬人，城寨的結構實世界少見。國共內戰後，大陸政權轉移，大批人口湧入香港，城寨租金低廉，吸納了不少移民，和香港一樣，成為一個移民社區 (城市)。在這個香港警察也不敢進入的空間，移民們自力更新，開展自己的新生活；但這裡同時也成為黑幫的溫床。基本上，城寨可分為黑暗期 (七十年代前) 和光明期 (七十年代後)。黑暗期黑幫橫行，黃賭毒比比皆是；七十年代香港政府成立廉政公署，包庇城寨黑幫活動的官員無法立足，黑幫亦逐漸退出城寨，不少家庭式小工廠取而代之，直至清拆。

城寨位於九龍半島九龍城區。城寨是指北方的東頭村道，南方的龍津道，東方的東正道和西邊的西城路之間的地域。而城寨內主要由以下幾條條街道構成：

由南至北：龍津道，龍津路，東頭村道
由東至西：龍城路，光明街，老人街，大井街，西城路[3]

我將以街道為單位，人和空間為主題，重構一幅城寨地圖。根據所參考的文本(包括文字和相片)，把這些鬆散零碎的資料拼貼組織，重構當時的街道。史書為這條街道提供空間上的資料，讓我們知道這個社區的空間結構；口述歷史的主角和聲音，把城寨居民放回街道之上。人和空間同時存在，呈現一個較完整的城寨生活。


城的入口─龍城路

龍城路，是和東正道平衡的一條路。北面的入口在東頭村道南面的行人路上；至於南面，據魯金《九龍城寨史話》，從外面望進去，入口剛好被益華樓和東南樓所隔，成三岔狀。此路名「龍城」，因為它是城寨的代表街道，是昔日城寨東門的所在地。而在龍城路的南面路口處，有一座東門樓。[4]

城寨街坊福利會在一九八三年做了個調查，城寨內各店舖，醫館，作坊工廠共有七百四十五所，當中有八十六所位於龍城路。[5]龍城路中有一家五金店，由李小姐負責，另外還有一位兼職。她們都是透過街招找到這份工作。[6]
在龍城路四號Ａ，有一間由Lam Mei Kwong[7]開辦的牙科診所。此診所在一九四九年開始經營，直至一九九一年清拆為止。「我服務的顧客，主要是中國人，但也有一些印度人。六十年代，脫一隻牙只需三元…至八十年代末，每位客人平均要付二百到七百元。[8]二十年前(六十年代)，我用十萬元起了一座十層高的大廈，每層五百呎。我要了四層，其他就每層三萬元賣出去」；另一位牙醫Wong Yu Ming每日工作二十四小時，在診所業務全盛時期雖顧用三名員工；到城寨清拆前，只餘下他一人。[9]


龍城的彌敦道─龍津路

龍津路是城寨最中心的街道，橫貫城的東西。所謂「津」，就是城門口的津樑，即是橫跨護城河直通城門的橋；「龍」，就是城的中心。城寨從前有護城的濠溝，也有城門和橋樑。「龍津」的意思，就是「聚龍通津」。即是這條街是由城門口的津樑一直通往城的中心之地。

龍津路是城寨最古老的道路，此一八四七年建城時便已經存在。它在龍津道的後面，東面的入口和龍城路一樣。人們要進龍津路，龍城路或者光明街，都必需先進這個由三棟樓組成的三岔。[10]

五十年代，龍津路的中心地段是黃賭毒的集散地。魯金憶及當年的賭館，在路中心，坐南向北，佔地約六百呎。門外有數個大漢，指著入面說「發財埋便！發財埋便」。門口掛上一張藍色的布簾。進門之後，有一張高約四呎的攤?和一張牌九?，扒攤的人就和荷官對著坐。牆角有一個神位，叫「地主財神神位」，上面有張黃紙，寫著「大殺三方」。除了番攤和牌九之外，後期還加入了十三張和骰寶。[11]

賭館旁邊，有一個大竹棚，是五三年建的一小舞台，約有百多個座位。黑幫請了幾個脫衣舞女郎表演。近至城寨邊緣，遠至油麻地榕樹頭和廟街一帶，都會有人宣傳脫衣舞表演。更有免費車來往旺角和城寨接送客人。表演每次收費五元，由下午五時開始，每次一小時，直到深夜[12]。林蔭的長篇小說《九龍城寨煙雲》曾詳細描寫脫衣舞的情況：「只見那舞孃脫剩胸罩和三角褲的時候，羞人答答的轉過面來，向台下的觀眾拋個媚眼。然後，舞台側的樂師停了奏樂，全場鴉雀無聲。一陣急驟的鼓聲中，那舞孃一邊繼續扭動屁股，一邊把兩手伸到背後，解開胸罩的扣子，把胸罩脫了下來。」[13]

黑幫撤出後，換了一些勤奮新移民開辦的小工廠和店舖。六八年，To Gui Bon在龍津後街開了他的膠製品廠。「我初來的時候，處處都是賣白粉的。我要小心的看著我的工廠，一不留神就會給他們偷東西」。城寨清拆之後，他要重操故業做司機，「我住在城寨，只會到附近食飯，然後又回來工作，所以我要學習看懂新的香港地圖…」[14]

同樣是在龍津後街，老街坊會在士多放下幾元，買少許鼓油啤酒，然後和老闆Chan Pak閒聊幾句。Chan Pak平時最喜歡和他那七隻小貓玩耍，和看他那個黑白電視機；Chan Pak士多旁邊是救世軍開辦的幼稚園，為城寨的小朋友提供教育。[15]

一九八三，Lam Leung Po在五十八號地下一個四百八十呎的舖位開設了他的食品加工廠。七個伙記每天製造三百盤絞魚粉團，送到全港超過二百家商店。從來沒有衛生署的人來檢查他的工場，「我們做的和出面工廠做的都是一樣，其實我也可以申請一個工廠牌照，但我們這裡實在不需要。」[16]

來自廣東的客家人Yu Hing Wan已經八十六歲 (1992)。十八年前，因為城寨的租金，搬到龍津路開了他的織布廠。作為寨中最後一家織布廠的老闆 / 工人，他不想離開「在出面做生意是不可能的，我也不會成為一個工廠的老闆」[17]

龍津路的中心，是「龍津義學」。義學是九龍城最著名的古老建築，於清道光年間建成。好像古代的貢院一樣，門上有石額，刻了當時新安縣知事王銘鼎所寫的「龍津義學」四字。這所義學可說是一所鄉公所，因為九龍司的鄉眾事務都在這裡處理。它後來成為一所社區性質的學校，民國時曾改為國民小學，後又改為「九龍城公立高初兩等義學」。[18]直到七十年代，地產商爭相發展興建高樓大廈，一九七五年，學校停辦，義學改建成一座高樓，名義學大樓。而附近則建有三興樓、萬安樓、萬成樓等高樓。位於龍津道五號的義學大樓地下大堂，設了一個宗教性的大堂「義德善社」。[19]

龍津路二號放著兩枚大炮，是改建九龍城區時搬走放到這裡的。炮上寫著「嘉慶七年仲春明，署廣東巡撫部院湖，協辦大學士兩廣部堂覺羅吉，提督廣東全省軍門孫，兩廣都轉鹽運使司，督造四千觔大炮一位」[20]


聚龍通津之路─龍津道

城牆被日軍拆去建機場之後，居民在原來的城基開闢了這條新的道路。因為最初滿是麻雀館，牌九檔，番攤館，狗肉檔和煙館等店舖，經營者也希望此路「聚龍通津」，所以只改一字做龍津道以作區別。[21]

吸食鴉片煙的工具是煙燈和煙槍，其時城寨的煙館以煙槍的數量分為兩種檔次。有一支煙槍的煙館，以「私家局」為號召，招待高消費的人；兩枝煙槍的，就是「大檔」，是低消費的人士的選擇。抽鴉片的準備工夫叫「打荷」，要先把鐵針挑到煙燈上，等鴉片遇火由液體變成固體。所以打荷的時候，煙槍讓給其他人吸食。這樣一枝槍同時有八至十個人使用，就是煙館入面的情況。[22]

狗肉店也是城寨特色。最著名的是孖記和釗記，兩個狗肉檔吸引了全港愛食狗肉的人來城寨。《九龍城寨煙雲》的主角韋天和光仔便曾為了賺錢而獵狗。「聽說孖記和釗記兩個狗肉檔生意好。狗隻供應不足…他們說小狗每隻三元，大狗每隻五元，唐狗番狗都照殺！」[23]

Chung Lo Ying住在龍津道八十二號四樓已經有十年，但是對城寨似乎不太熟悉，「拿水很麻煩，吸毒的人也經常打交，但我們也沒有什麼事，女兒被打過一次劫…我從來只行主要的街道，其他的我不大知道…」[24]；同住在同一條街的Chan Pui Yin一九四七年由潮州到達城寨，一九五五年開了他自己的藥房。他不想搬走，「住在這裡，就好似回到中國的家鄉一樣，這裡沒有管制，是一個和諧的自由之地。」[25]


黑暗的光明街

六十年代的光明街，終日都是燈光照耀。早上，陽光在沒有高樓的阻擋下直射到街上；晚上，白粉檔都會點燃蠟燭吸引吸毒的人。故此，人們便稱它為光明街。白粉友叫它做「電台街」，白粉檔則是「電台」。當白粉友沒有白粉時，就是一個半死的人，沒精打彩。所以他們要到電台「上電」，而電台就在光明街。街上通常有八、九檔白粉檔，每檔都有一張用木箱製成的四方矮?，上面有四、五支白蠟燭，周圍放了五、六張小?供道友坐下吸食。毒癮最深的「白粉道人」，會蹲在地上吸食。這個就是五、六十年代的光明街每天晚上的情況。[26]

七十年代，兩層高的石屋被改建成高樓。光明樓、明光樓、光榮樓、榮光樓、東明樓相繼出現。白粉檔亦改為製造魚蛋、豬血、砵仔糕，燒臘等的食品工場進駐。Kwok Tsang Ming在光明街的一家小魚蛋工場工作，每天把魚蛋送到城外的魚蛋粉檔[27]；而Hui Tung Choy的麵廠和他兩個女兒都在光明街二號，喜歡城寨，因為它給予他工作機會和自由，「沒有人會想知道這裡發生甚麼事，因為這裡是中國的領地…這裡從來沒有甚麼問題，惟一的問題是那些人搬走後，到處都是老鼠和蟑螂。」[28]


充滿生機的老人街

二十年代，基督教團體見原九龍司衙門有倒塌危險，乃進城改建為老人院。直至五十年代初，城寨的新移民在老人院旁興建新屋，形成的小路就名為老人街。它的南面入口是龍津道一一三號，直申延到東頭村道。由於城寨地勢是西北高而東南低，街道有些傾斜，下雨時很容易會水浸。[29]

老人街以老人院為中心。七十三歲 (1989) 的婆婆Kwok Lau Hing，每天都會到老人院坐坐，就是為了一碗免費的粥「城寨會拆，真的有點不捨得。我曾經見證過這個地方的高樓愈起愈高，也記得火災如何靠近我們的家，還有那種時時要準備逃離家園的感覺。城寨經常有發生火災的危險，但它始終是窮人的一個庇護所」。老人院後面從前是九龍司的內院，後改建成一所青少年中心，是青年兒童的好去處，內有閱報室、康樂棋、遊戲室等設備，也會開辦一些學習興趣班。老人院旁是「中華傳道會恩光學校」。學校多年一直反對老人街一帶改建為高樓，他們希望城寨應該至少有一部份接觸到陽光和新鮮空間，而這幾座建築物也就成為惟一能見到太陽和月亮的地方。[30]

一九七八年從清遠來港，幾年後自力更生在老人街開了自己的燒蠟店，Yim Kwok Yuen從來不覺得城寨像外人想像中差，「我來香港的時候甚麼也不怕，起碼這裡沒有人對你差。我由一個衛生環境更差的地方來，只是空氣好少少。對於我來講，香港簡直是個天堂…」[31]


龍城的大水庫─大井街

城寨是用作軍事防守之用，故必要有自給自足的水，以防敵軍斷絕水源攻城，大井街的水井就是因此以開。大水井在八號興發樓旁，從龍津道穿過祥興樓與兩合樓就可見到。城寨沒有得到水務署供水，居民只可飲用井水。直至五十年代，水井被封，居民則在水井旁弄了條街喉，各自把自家的水管和街喉接駁取水。因此大井街頭頂滿是水喉，有些穿了破了，水漏下來，令暗淡無光的街道也下起雨來。[32]

大井五巷有一所已有九十年歷史的福德廟，由一位七十多歲的廟祝打理。廟祝是潮州人，三代都是在這家廟當廟祝。拜祭的人主要是城寨附近的人，有潮州人，客家人及上海人。七十年代，發展商在廟的旁邊起了很多高樓，前往福德廟的街道變得迂迴曲折，陰暗濕滑，所以前去拜祭的人愈來愈少。[33]

大井街十號是Ho Chi Kam的理髮店，十二號是Lee Pui Yuen的士多，二十五號是Lam Tseng Yat的士多。Cheung San的木材廠，Chan Kwong的製膠公司也同在同一條街上。[34]


西方的邊陲－西城路

西城路是由南至北的街道，南面由龍津道尾起，北至東頭村道西城樓旁，它在東頭村道的入口是全個城寨最容易找到的入口。此路因為處於西邊城基的所在地而得名。它又有最多的小巷，共有八條西城小巷，但到七十年代，發展商寸土必爭，在很多小巷起了高樓，令很多小路堵塞了。[35]

Lee Yu Chun 一九六四年開始在她家的糖果廠工作，七十年代初在西城路十二號定居下來，直至城寨清拆。「我爸爸的哲學是出去世界，看多點東西。但是十多年來，我每天都在這裡工作幾小時。不過，我們在這裡是為自己工作，也有多點自由」[36]；十四歲便出來幫父親打理潮州糕餅店的Chau Sau Yee說「拆城寨比起一九九七還重要，我經常這麼想…」[37]


北方的邊界－東頭村道

它是最北的街道，向著美東村。沒有文本記載這條上有甚麼人和店，但是照片讓我們知道，志青診所、健齒牙科、新龍都理髮公司、龍門診所、張泉趺打、楊永光牙醫、樂福華牙科、崇安診所、柔濟診所、楊泰昌士多、萬國診所、蕭美美婦科、美東醫學化驗中心、許熾昌牙科、松發冰室、麗斯牙科、孫仰光牙科、美斯鑲牙室、國際診所、大眾診所、王偉權牙科、魏漢文牙科…都是在這條街上的。[38]


城寨的終結

一九八七年一月十四日，港府決定清拆城寨，定於一九九一年完工。中國外交部同日發表聲明，「九龍城城寨和香港其他地區一樣是歷史遺留下來的問題…切實改善九龍城寨的生活環境，不但符合城寨居民的切身利益，也符合全體香港居民的利益，我們對於香港英國政府準備採取妥善措施，清拆九龍城寨，並在原址上興建公園的決定表示充份的理解…」[39]。英國人在中國人的同意下，把繫著拆樓機那個大鐵鎚的紅絲帶剪掉，大鐵鎚撞向龍津道上的一座高樓，城寨要變為平地；那一邊廂，不滿家園被摧毀的居民，在東頭村的行人路上露宿，而示抗議…[40]

在一九九二年的年鑑《香港》中，「九龍城寨」四個字，只曾在兩個地方出現，第一個是在「土地、公共工程及共用事務」中的「土地徵用」部份，「…政府為了施行各項公共工程計劃，或以協議方式徵用，或用權力強制徵用港島及九龍市區的土地和樓宇…所涉及的公共工程計劃，計有大老山隧道，連接中環與半山區的電動扶梯系統，以及九龍城寨清拆計劃。」；第二是「歷史」部份，「…一八九九年十二月二十七日…由英國單方面接管九龍城。」城寨居民在這條夾縫的共同記憶和自由空間，被政府的鐵鎚打破了。[41]

今年四月，我到了九龍城寨公園，想看看城寨博物館和到公園找找城寨的老街坊。博物館只有幾幅照片，還有供遊客品茗的地方；公園的老人家，很多都是新搬到城寨的，對這裡一無所知。找到一個婆婆，說曾經在城寨住了十年，但怎樣也不肯告訴我城寨的事，只說了一句「人家官字兩個口，想怎樣就怎樣…」。

除了幾本野史書及相片集，記載城寨生活歷史的文本少之又少。林蔭的長篇小說更是惟一的城寨文學。西西在《飛氈》中說過：「攤開一幅肥土鎮的地圖，地圖變成白紙，播放一卷錄影帶，卻是洗刷後的灰暗的雪花。寫故事的人的桌上，只剩下空白的書頁。」[42]嘗試重繪城寨的地圖，不是為了對著那些文本懷舊一番，而是為了更好地思考我們與自己的生活空間的關係。

參考書目

中文
1. 九龍城星報 (1985年8月27日)
2. 《香港》 (香港政府印務局, 1992)
3. 魯金:《九龍城寨史話》(三聯, 1988)
4. 葉靈鳳: 〈九龍城寨的主權問題〉,《香港的失落》(中華, 1989)
5. 喬健, 蘇崇尹, 林進光, 梁楚安:〈九龍城寨的居民〉, 《羅香林教授紀念論文集下集》 (珠海文史研究所學會, 1992)
6. 也斯: 〈城寨風情〉, 《遊離的詩》(牛津, 1995)
7. 梁炳華:《城寨與中英外交》(麒麟, 1995)
8. 陳娟: 〈雨後逛九龍城寨〉, 《陳娟文集》(香港文學報社, 1996)
9. 林力安: 〈元旦遊九龍城寨公園〉, 《林力安選集》(獲益, 1996)
10. 林蔭: 《九龍城寨煙雲》(獲益, 1996)
11. 也斯:〈九龍城寨－我們的空間〉, 《越界書簡》(青文, 1996)
12. 西西: 《飛氈》(洪範, 1997)


英文

1. CHAN Cheung Ming, Alfred, AU Chor Fai, CHOY Bing Kong: A Longitudinal Study on the Kowloon Walled City Clearance: The pattern of service utilization, community identity and life satisfaction of the residents (Hong Kong: Centre for Hong Kong Studies, CUHK, 1991)

2. Greg Girard, Ian Lambot: City of Darkness: Life in Kowloon Walled City (Watermark, 1993)


電視節目

1. 《鏗鏘集》〈拆城〉(香港電台電視部, 1990)
2. 《鏗鏘集》〈城寨選民〉(香港電台電視部, 1993)
[1] 也斯:〈九龍城寨: 我們的空間〉, 《越界書簡》, 115-118頁
[2] 有關城寨治權中英兩國的爭拗過程, 可參閱梁炳華:《城寨與中英外交》23-62頁
[3] 詳情請看本文最後一頁的地圖
[4] 魯金:《九龍城寨史話》, 123頁
[5] 喬健, 蘇崇尹, 林進光, 梁楚安:〈九龍城寨的居民〉,《羅香林教授紀念論文集下集》, 1009頁
[6] Ibid, 1020頁
[7] 由於我所參考的是英文書Greg Girard, Ian Lambot 的City of Darkness: Life in Kowloon Walled City, 所以這篇文章部份人名是直接引用此書的英文翻譯
[8] Greg Girard, Ian Lambot: City of Darkness: Life in Kowloon Walled City, P.24
[9] Ibid, P.160
[10] 魯金:《九龍城寨史話》, 125-126頁
[11] Ibid, 106-107頁
[12] Ibid, 104-105頁
[13] 林蔭:《九龍城寨煙雲》(獲益, 1996), 44頁
[14] Greg Girard, Ian Lambot: City of Darkness: Life in Kowloon Walled City, P.98
[15] Ibid, P.23
[16] Ibid, P.102
[17] Ibid, P.150
[18] 魯金:《九龍城寨史話》, 146頁
[19] 喬健, 蘇崇尹, 林進光, 梁楚安:〈九龍城寨的居民〉,《羅香林教授紀念論文集下集》, 1030頁
[20] 九龍城星報, 1985年8月27日, 4頁
[21] 魯金:《九龍城寨史話》, 126-128頁
[22] 魯金:《九龍城寨史話》, 114-116頁
[23] 林蔭:《九龍城寨煙雲》(獲益, 1996), 22頁
[24] Greg Girard, Ian Lambot: City of Darkness: Life in Kowloon Walled City, P.112
[25] Ibid, P.80
[26] 魯金:《九龍城寨史話》, 111-113頁
[27] Greg Girard, Ian Lambot: City of Darkness: Life in Kowloon Walled City, P.188
[28] Ibid, P.21
[29] 魯金:《九龍城寨史話》, 130-132頁
[30] Greg Girard, Ian Lambot: City of Darkness: Life in Kowloon Walled City, P.136-137
[31] Ibid, P.92
[32] 魯金:《九龍城寨史話》, 132-133頁
[33] 喬健, 蘇崇尹, 林進光, 梁楚安:〈九龍城寨的居民〉,《羅香林教授紀念論文集下集》, 1034頁
[34] Greg Girard, Ian Lambot: City of Darkness: Life in Kowloon Walled City, P.54, 104, 145, 148, 181
[35] 魯金:《九龍城寨史話》, 136-139頁
[36] Greg Girard, Ian Lambot: City of Darkness: Life in Kowloon Walled City, P.140
[37] Ibid, P.152
[38] Ibid, P.172, 178
[39] 魯金:《九龍城寨史話》, 168-169頁
[40] 有關城寨居民日後的去向, 可參考1990年3月29日的香港電台電視部《鏗鏘集》〈拆城〉(180集) 及1993年4月5 日〈城寨遺民〉(294集)
[41] 《香港》 (香港政府印務局, 1992), 178及337頁
[42] 西西:《飛氈》(洪範, 1997), 513頁